Jurisprudência dos Tribunais Superiores Portugueses: Recolha de Setembro de 2026

Jurisprudência

Nos últimos meses, o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça e os Tribunais da Relação proferiram diversos acórdãos de relevo em matéria de Direito do Consumo. Destacam-se, designadamente, acórdãos sobre o conceito de consumidor, a falta de conformidade em contratos de compra e venda e de empreitada, os serviços públicos essenciais, o Procedimento Extrajudicial de Regularização de Situações de Incumprimento (PERSI) e os pressupostos da ação popular.

A constante densificação jurisprudencial observada assume um papel determinante no reforço da tutela dos consumidores e no equilíbrio das relações de consumo. Ao clarificar o alcance prático dos conceitos e das regras legais aplicáveis a cada caso, a jurisprudência dos Tribunais Superiores fixa critérios orientadores fundamentais, assegurando uma aplicação mais uniforme do Direito e conferindo maior previsibilidade e segurança a todos os intervenientes.

Apresenta-se, de seguida, a análise das decisões de maior relevância proferidas e publicadas nos últimos meses.

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça decide sobre o ónus da prova da existência de falta de conformidade no momento da entrega um veículo automóvel que deflagrou em chamas

Por acórdão relatado pelo Juiz Conselheiro Jorge Leal, de 7 de julho, o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça julgou improcedente a revista excecional de um acórdão relativo à imputação da desconformidade de um automóvel usado, adquirido por um consumidor, que resultou no incêndio do veículo em circulação passados seis meses da sua entrega.

O cerne da questão assentava na impossibilidade de ambas as partes fazerem prova da causa do incêndio, devido ao grau de destruição do veículo, e se seria defensável imputar ao consumidor o ónus de provar que o defeito causador do incêndio era preexistente.

O Tribunal esclareceu que é expectável que um veículo possua características respeitantes à segurança na sua utilização e que circule sem deflagrar subitamente em chamas, constituindo este um requisito objetivo de conformidade nos termos do artigo 7.º, n.º 1, alínea c), do Decreto-Lei n.º 84/2021, de 9 de dezembro. Assim, no caso em apreço, o Tribunal concluiu pela falta de conformidade.

Por fim, o Tribunal decidiu que, tendo o consumidor a expectativa de que o veículo se encontrava em boas condições de funcionamento e não sendo possível determinar a origem do incêndio, tendo este ocorrido dentro do prazo previsto do artigo 13.º, n.º 1 do DL nº 84/2021, e sendo, por isso, presumido existente à data da entrega, a situação deve qualificar-se como a manifestação de uma desconformidade do veículo à data da aquisição. Assim, cabia ao vendedor o ónus de demonstrar que o incêndio não era imputável a um defeito preexistente.

O Tribunal deliberou ainda que o facto de o consumidor ter alterado o escape da viatura não ilidia a presunção de desconformidade, por não ter ficado provado que essa alteração poderia ter sido a causa do incêndio.

Confirmando a decisão recorrida, o Tribunal concluiu que o consumidor tinha direito à resolução do contrato e à indemnização pelos danos sofridos.

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça esclarece que, na petição inicial de uma ação popular, não é necessária a individualização em concreto de todos os consumidores lesados e dos respetivos prejuízos

O Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, em acórdão relatado a 7 de julho, pelo Juiz Conselheiro Arlindo Oliveira, julgou procedente o recurso per saltum de uma ação popular intentada para a defesa dos direitos dos consumidores, fundamentada em prática comercial desleal, ação enganosa e prática comercial coerciva ou de influência indevida por parte da ré, nos termos da Diretiva 2005/29/CE.

As questões essenciais pautavam-se por verificar se a ação configurava uma ação popular que abrangesse a tutela de interesses difusos, coletivos e individuais homogéneos dos consumidores, permitindo a cumulação de pedidos declarativos, inibitórios e indemnizatórios, bem como aferir se a petição inicial seria inepta por não alegar os factos concretos e individualizados que consubstanciavam a causa de pedir.

Quanto à primeira questão, o Tribunal esclareceu que a exigência, na petição inicial, da individualização em concreto de todos os consumidores lesados e a quantificação concreta dos prejuízos de cada um deles seria praticamente impossível, configurando uma verdadeira denegação de justiça econstituindo ainda uma “autêntica prova diabólica”. No entanto, o Tribunal clarificou que tal entendimento não se traduz num “cheque em branco” aos eventuais lesados, incumbindo a estes, no prosseguimento da ação, fazerem prova da sua pertença ao universo dos lesados.

Relativamente à causa de pedir, o Tribunal decidiu que não se tratava de uma situação de ausência de alegação de danos, sendo apenas necessário corrigir as insuficiências e imprecisões na forma que foram alegadas, vertente que ganha especial relevância em face das especificidades da ação popular quanto à individualização concreta dos lesados.

Em suma, o Tribunal decidiu pela revogação da decisão recorrida e ordenou a baixa dos autos à 1.ª instância, a fim de o Juiz convidar a autora a suprir as insuficiências ou imprecisões quanto à alegação dos danos.

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça decide no sentido da impossibilidade de substituição do regime do PERSI por qualquer tipo de negociações informais

Por acórdão relatado pela Juíza Conselheira Maria Olinda Garcia, proferido no dia 13 de julho, o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça julgou procedente a revista excecional numa ação executiva proposta por uma instituição de crédito contra clientes consumidores, fundada no incumprimento de um contrato de mútuo e na subsequente sujeição ao regime legal do PERSI, nos termos do DL n.º 227/2012, de 25 de outubro.

O objeto da revista centrou-se na questão de saber se a mera existência de negociações entre a entidade mutuante e o cliente consumidor seria suficiente para se considerar cumprido o regime do PERSI antes da propositura da ação executiva ou se tais negociações teriam necessariamente de se desenvolver no quadro formal imposto pelas normas legais que regem esse procedimento.

O Tribunal esclareceu que o legislador não se limitou a consagrar que a ação executiva movida por um credor financeiro contra um consumidor deve ser antecedida de negociações. Em vez disso, estabeleceu um sistema formal no DL n.º 227/2012, com regras e prazos bem definidos, o PERSI, concretizando uma tutela reforçada dos consumidores enquanto clientes bancários.

Neste sentido, o Tribunal clarificou que o procedimento não pode ser encarado como um mero conjunto de formalidades eventualmente dispensáveis nem ser substituído por qualquer tipo de negociações. Tal entendimento decorre de exigências de segurança jurídica, da previsibilidade do momento do recurso à ação executiva e de evitar dúvidas sobre se a intensidade ou duração dessas negociações informais satisfariam o propósito do legislador ao instituir o PERSI.

Concretamente, o Tribunal decidiu que o envio da comunicação de integração no PERSI a apenas um dos executados e o posterior envio da comunicação de extinção a ambos correspondiam a lapsos no cumprimento de formalidades que não demonstravam a existência de efetivas negociações conformes ao disposto nos artigos 15.º e 16.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 227/2012. Ademais, o Tribunal sublinhou que a comunicação de extinção do PERSI não faz presumir o prévio envio de comunicação de integração no procedimento, incumbindo ao credor a prova de ambas as etapas.

Em suma, o Tribunal revogou o acórdão recorrido e julgou não demonstrado o cumprimento do PERSI em relação aos executados. Verificou-se, assim, o impedimento legal constante do artigo 18.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 227/2012, que obsta à propositura da ação executiva, constituindo uma exceção dilatória insuprível que conduz à extinção da instância executiva.

Supremo Tribunal de Justiça clarifica que a possibilidade de repercussão do sobrecusto do Ajuste MIBEL nos consumidores finais reveste natureza legal dispositiva e exige estipulação e esclarecimento contratual prévio

O Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, no acórdão relatado pela Juíza Conselheira Maria da Graça Trigo proferido a 17 de setembro, negou provimento ao recurso de revista no âmbito de uma ação fundada num contrato de fornecimento de energia elétrica, enquanto serviço público essencial, celebrado com consumidores finais.

O objeto do recurso passava por decidir a qualificação jurídica das normas do Decreto-Lei n.º 33/2022, relativas ao mecanismo ibérico de ajuste MIBEL e a sua repercussão na esfera jurídica dos consumidores finais, bem como verificar o cumprimento dos deveres de informação pré-contratual no âmbito do Regime das Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais e verificar se existiu abuso do direito.

No que respeita à natureza jurídica do ajuste MIBEL, o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça começou por analisar se a repercussão deste sobrecusto na esfera jurídica dos consumidores finais de energia elétrica decorria de norma legal imperativa com aplicação automática nos contratos a preço fixo ou se revestia natureza dispositiva. O Tribunal considerou que o regime do Decreto-Lei n.º 33/2022 opera de modo disjuntivo, ou seja, é de aplicação imperativa (ex lege) no mercado grossista de eletricidade, onde impõe a compensação aos produtores a gás, mas assume natureza meramente dispositiva ou concessiva (ex contractu) no mercado retalhista. Assim, a lei concede ao comercializador a faculdade de repercutir o sobrecusto no cliente final não isento ou de o internalizar na sua margem comercial por razões de estratégia concorrencial, dependendo a sua cobrança efetiva de concreta estipulação contratual.

Quanto às fontes normativas do dever de informação pré-contratual e o seu incumprimento, o Tribunal aferiu a origem e o cumprimento das obrigações de esclarecimento por parte do fornecedor de energia em relação à cobrança deste específico encargo. O Tribunal considerou que, estando no âmbito das relações de consumo e no domínio de um serviço público essencial prestado através de contratos de adesão, recai sobre o comercializador um dever de informação particularmente intenso, fundado no art. 227.º do Código Civil, no art. 184.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 15/2022, no art. 4.º da Lei n.º 23/96 e nos arts. 5.º e 6.º do RCCG. Tendo os contratos sido celebrados sob a modalidade de “preço fixo” e contendo apenas uma cláusula geral genérica e vaga sobre “outros custos legalmente exigidos”, concluiu-se que a ré violou o dever de informação transparente ao omitir por completo, na fase negocial, a aplicação do ajuste MIBEL e o seu significativo impacto financeiro.

O Tribunal esclarece ainda que, face à absoluta ambiguidade sobre se o custo final abrange ou não os encargos derivados do ajuste MIBEL, de acordo com a regra de que na dúvida prevalece o sentido mais favorável aos aderentes, a cláusula contratual deve ser interpretada no sentido de não abranger tais encargos.

Quanto às consequências jurídicas dessa omissão, o Tribunal entendeu que a falta de informação clara e concreta sobre a incidência do ajuste MIBEL determina a imediata exclusão da cláusula do contrato singular, nos termos do art. 8.º, alínea b), do RCCG. Foi rejeitada a pretensão da ré de aplicar as normas do Decreto-Lei n.º 33/2022 a título de integração supletiva, nos termos do art. 9.º do RCCG, clarificando-se que a norma legal em causa é concessiva e não supletiva, e que acolher a tese contrária implicaria reverter a exclusão, esvaziando a função tutelar do regime das cláusulas contratuais gerais.

Por fim, no que respeita ao alegado abuso do direito por parte dos consumidores finais, o acórdão abordou a alegação de venire contra factum proprium deduzida pela comercializadora, a qual sustentava que as autoras pretendiam beneficiar da contenção de preços sem suportar o encargo associado. O Tribunal afastou a existência de qualquer atuação ilícita ou abusiva ao abrigo do art. 334.º do Código Civil. Considerou-se que a recusa de pagamento do ajuste MIBEL não decorre de um comportamento contraditório, mas sim do exercício legítimo de uma tutela concedida por lei ao consumidor perante o incumprimento do dever pré-contratual de informação por parte da própria ré, mantendo-se os contratos válidos e expurgados da cláusula excluída em nome do princípio da conservação dos negócios jurídicos.

Em suma, o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça decidiu julgar improcedente o recurso de revista e confirmar a decisão recorrida, declarando a não exigibilidade do sobrecusto do ajuste MIBEL às autoras, na qualidade de consumidoras finais.

Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa clarifica que, até à comunicação da extinção do PERSI, o devedor consumidor encontra-se em situação de mora e não de incumprimento definitivo

Por acórdão relatado a 9 de julho, pelo Juiz Desembargador Fernando Caetano Besteiro, o Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa julgou improcedente o recurso de apelação no âmbito de um litígio emergente de um contrato de crédito ao consumo, com foco na verificação do cumprimento dos requisitos formais do PERSI e nas suas consequências processuais, nos termos do DL n.º 227/2012.

O objeto do recurso centrou-se em verificar se a decisão de primeira instância incorrera em erro ao julgar verificada a exceção dilatória atinente à falta de demonstração da integração dos executados no PERSI e da subsequente extinção desse procedimento.

A instituição bancária exequente pretendia o provimento do recurso para fazer prosseguir a ação executiva intentada contra os clientes consumidores. Contudo, o Tribunal da Relação sublinhou que o regime do PERSI consagra normas de ordem pública com caráter eminentemente protetor do cliente bancário consumidor que enfrente dificuldades no cumprimento das obrigações decorrentes de contratos de crédito, razão pela qual se exige a rigorosa observância dos seus requisitos formais antes de os demandar judicialmente.

Neste enquadramento, o Tribunal considerou que a comprovação do cumprimento dos deveres de comunicação de integração no PERSI e da respetiva extinção constitui uma condição de admissibilidade da ação declarativa ou executiva, cuja omissão gera uma exceção dilatória insuprível, de conhecimento oficioso, que determina a absolvição da instância.

A instituição de crédito alegava que o contrato já se encontrava definitivamente incumprido e resolvido em 2011, antes da entrada em vigor do Decreto-Lei n.º 227/2012, a 1 de janeiro de 2013, motivo pelo qual o regime do PERSI não seria aplicável nem haveria necessidade de nele integrar os devedores.

Contudo, o Tribunal sustentou que o cumprimento das obrigações decorrentes do PERSI apenas seria dispensado se o contrato tivesse sido efetivamente resolvido por incumprimento em data anterior. Como a prova dos autos demonstrou que a comunicação do prazo suplementar razoável para cumprimento e a interpelação resolutiva do contrato só ocorreram em 2023, juntamente com o requerimento executivo, o Tribunal entendeu que, até essa data, a situação contratual dos executados se reconduzia à simples mora.

Assim, o Tribunal concluiu que, à data da entrada em vigor do regime do PERSI, o contrato em causa permanecia em vigor, pelo que os devedores consumidores não podiam ser demandados judicialmente sem a prévia e regular observância desse procedimento. Não se mostrando provadas a integração dos executados no PERSI nem a sua válida extinção, julgou-se verificada a exceção dilatória inominada decorrente dessa omissão.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou improcedente o recurso, confirmando a decisão recorrida e mantendo a absolvição dos clientes bancários da instância executiva e a consequente extinção da execução, por força da inobservância do regime legal imperativo do PERSI.

Tribunal da Relação do Porto clarifica que recai sobre o terceiro adquirente do bem o ónus de alegar e provar a sua qualidade de consumidor para beneficiar do regime do DL nº 67/2003

O Tribunal da Relação do Porto, por acórdão relatado pela Juíza Desembargadora Ana Paula Amorim, no dia 1 de julho, julgou improcedente o recurso de apelação, com voto de vencido, no âmbito de uma ação emergente de um contrato de locação financeira de um automóvel novo com defeito, com posterior transmissão da posição de comprador ao autor.

A questão do recurso mais relevante para a análise centra-se em verificar se o autor cumprira o ónus de alegação e prova da sua qualidade de consumidor, condição indispensável para a aplicação do regime especial de proteção.

Não se encontrando apuradas as circunstâncias em que a posição do comprador se transmitiu ao autor-apelante, o Tribunal considerou que é a data da celebração do primitivo contrato de compra e venda que determina o regime jurídico aplicável, no caso, o regime do Decreto-Lei n.º 67/2003, de 8 de abril, na redação conferida pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 84/2008, de 21 de maio.

Quanto à qualificação do contrato como venda de bens de consumo nos termos do aludido diploma, o Tribunal da Relação analisou se o caso prefigurava uma relação de consumo, sublinhando que o ónus da prova recai sobre quem pretende beneficiar de tal regime legal.

Neste sentido, não sendo o autor o primeiro adquirente do bem e pretendendo beneficiar do regime previsto no artigo 4.º, n.º 6, do referido diploma, incumbia-lhe o ónus de alegar e provar que, na transação que celebrou, interveio na qualidade de consumidor, isto é, que adquiriu o veículo para uso pessoal e não profissional ou, pelo menos, predominantemente não profissional, e que a pessoa que lho vendeu atuou no âmbito da sua atividade profissional.

O Tribunal entendeu que o autor não alegou e, como tal, não provou a qualidade de consumidor na aceção do Decreto-Lei n.º 67/2003. Consequentemente, não podia beneficiar do regime previsto nesse diploma, não merecendo qualquer censura a sentença recorrida por não ter aplicado o prazo de caducidade previsto no artigo 5.º-A para as vendas de bens de consumo.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou o recurso improcedente, confirmando a sentença recorrida.

Não obstante, o Juiz Desembargador Jorge Martins Ribeiro lavrou voto de vencido, por entender que se justificava conceder provimento ao recurso, anular a sentença recorrida e determinar a ampliação da matéria de facto a fim de averiguar os factos relativos ao estatuto de consumidor. Argumentou que o Tribunal de 1.ª instância poderia e deveria ter averiguado essa factualidade, frisando ainda que, sendo o primeiro locatário e o autor pessoas singulares, estariam, em princípio e salvo melhor averiguação, em condições de beneficiar do estatuto de consumidores.

Tribunal da Relação do Porto reforça a necessidade de o exequente provar a resolução do contrato de crédito em data anterior à entrada em vigor do DL n.º 227/2012 para afastar a obrigatoriedade do PERSI

No acórdão de 1 de julho, relatado pela Juíza Desembargadora Manuela Machado, o Tribunal da Relação do Porto julgou improcedente o recurso de apelação relativo a uma ação executiva fundada no incumprimento de um contrato de crédito celebrado com um cliente bancário consumidor, centrando-se a análise no regime legal do PERSI, disposto no DL nº 227/2012.

As questões centrais pautavam-se por saber se o cliente consumidor deveria ter sido integrado no PERSI como condição objetiva de procedibilidade da ação executiva, bem como apurar se o contrato de crédito em causa teria sido resolvido antes da entrada em vigor do referido diploma legal, ocorrida a 1 de janeiro de 2013.

Neste âmbito, o Tribunal esclareceu que a obrigação de integração dos devedores no PERSI, imposta às instituições de crédito e aos cessionários do crédito, se aplica aos contratos que não se encontrassem resolvidos à data da entrada em vigor do Decreto-Lei n.º 227/2012, desde que se verifique o não cumprimento de obrigações dele decorrentes, ou seja, desde que o devedor se encontre em mora.

Recaindo sobre a entidade de crédito ou sobre a quem foi o crédito cedido o ónus da prova do cumprimento das obrigações decorrentes do PERSI, nomeadamente as fases de integração e de extinção do procedimento, enquanto condições objetivas de procedibilidade da execução, o Tribunal sublinhou que recai igualmente sobre essas entidades o ónus de demonstrar que o cliente consumidor não estava sujeito ao PERSI em virtude de uma resolução contratual anterior à entrada em vigor do diploma.

Contudo, o Tribunal concluiu que a exequente não apresentou qualquer prova de que o contrato de crédito tivesse sido resolvido antes de 1 de janeiro de 2013, salientando que a única comunicação com menção à resolução do contrato apenas foi enviada ao consumidor no ano de 2024.

Assim, a prévia integração do devedor no PERSI constituía uma condição objetiva de procedibilidade que não foi observada, motivo pelo qual a ação executiva não podia ter sido intentada, devendo ser julgada extinta.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou improcedente o recurso, confirmando a decisão recorrida que julgou procedentes os embargos de executado e declarou a extinção da instância executiva por falta de integração do cliente bancário consumidor no regime do PERSI.

Tribunal da Relação do Porto reforça a tutela do direito do consumidor à resolução do contrato no âmbito da venda de automóvel com desconformidade

Por acórdão relatado pelo Juiz Desembargador Carlos Gil, proferido a 1 de julho, o Tribunal da Relação do Porto julgou o recurso de apelação parcialmente procedente no âmbito de uma ação declarativa de condenação intentada para efetivar o direito de resolução do contrato relativo à compra e venda de um automóvel usado desconforme.

O objeto do recurso que nos releva centrou-se em comprovar a existência da desconformidade no veículo vendido, verificar se ocorreu violação da hierarquia no exercício dos direitos em caso de venda de coisa desconforme e decidir os efeitos da resolução contratual.

Por ter sido vendido como bem usado, o Tribunal esclareceu que o prazo de responsabilidade da vendedora por falta de conformidade foi reduzido para 18 meses, nos termos do DL n.º 84/2021.

O Tribunal concluiu que o automóvel padecia de falta de conformidade objetiva, nos termos da alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 7.º do referido diploma, demonstrada pelas patologias que foi manifestando ao longo de nove meses, sem que nenhuma intervenção mecânica obtivesse sucesso. Neste sentido, o Tribunal entendeu que o estado do veículo não correspondia à funcionalidade esperada de uma viatura destinada a uso diário, situação agravada por um defeito no filtro de partículas que impedia a utilização do veículo em percursos exclusivamente urbanos. O Tribunal sublinhou ainda que tal falta de conformidade se presume legalmente existente à data da entrega do bem, nos termos do artigo 13.º, n.ºs 1 e 3, do diploma.

Quanto à invocação da violação da hierarquia no exercício dos direitos, o Tribunal esclareceu que a primeira manifestação da inadequação funcional do veículo para circulação urbana ocorreu antes de decorrido um mês sobre a compra do veículo. Neste enquadramento, entendeu o Tribunal que a consumidora podia, à sua escolha, solicitar a imediata substituição do bem ou a resolução do contrato, nos termos do artigo 16º do DL nº 84/2021.

Além disso, o Tribunal considerou que a impossibilidade de uso exclusivo do veículo em circuito urbano constitui uma limitação de tal forma severa ao uso da viatura que consubstancia uma falta de conformidade grave, para os efeitos da alínea d) do n.º 4 do artigo 15.º do referido diploma. Assim, concluiu-se que a consumidora não violou a hierarquia dos direitos, limitando-se a exercer o direito potestativo extintivo que a lei lhe conferia por falta de conformidade objetiva, devidamente fundado em duas previsões legais distintas.

Relativamente aos efeitos da resolução contratual, o Tribunal esclareceu que esta se tornou eficaz quando a vendedora tomou conhecimento da declaração resolutiva endereçada pela consumidora em 2023. Perante essa declaração, a vendedora não colaborou no sentido de permitir a restituição do veículo pela consumidora, nem a impugnou judicialmente. Tal atitude passiva determinou a sua constituição em mora, com a consequente inversão do risco de perda da coisa.

Por fim, verificando-se no caso em apreço uma situação de coligação negocial, entre o contrato de compra e venda e o contrato de crédito ao consumo, e tendo a consumidora suportado o pagamento de prestações à entidade financeira, que, por sua vez, liquidava montantes à vendedora, o Tribunal condenou a vendedora a restituir os valores ao banco financiador e condenou este a restituir os valores das prestações pagas à consumidora.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou o recurso parcialmente procedente quanto aos efeitos da resolução do contrato, alterando a sentença recorrida no sentido de determinar que a vendedora proceda à indicação de dia e hora, no prazo de 10 dias após o trânsito em julgado, para que a consumidora lhe restitua o veículo.

Tribunal da Relação de Coimbra esclarece a aplicação do direito à reparação de defeitos numa empreitada de consumo perante a falta de desconformidade da obra

Em acórdão relatado pela Juíza Desembargadora Emília Botelho Vaz, proferido a 9 de julho, o Tribunal da Relação de Coimbra julgou parcialmente procedente o recurso de apelação no âmbito de um litígio emergente de um contrato de empreitada de consumo, centrado na existência de falta de conformidade da obra executada.

As questões a decidir pautavam-se por saber se à consumidora, dona da obra, assiste o direito à reparaçãodo telhado e à entrega de garantia de conformidade do betão aplicado na obra, bem como a apreciação da invocação de abuso de direito por parte do empreiteiro em relação à dona da obra.

O Tribunal esclareceu que ao caso em apreço se aplicava o regime da empreitada de consumo, porquanto a dona da obra assume a qualidade de consumidora e a obra se destinava a uso não profissional, sendo aplicável o Decreto-Lei n.º 84/2021, de 9 de dezembro, sem prejuízo da aplicação subsidiária do Código Civil.

Neste regime, o Tribunal clarificou que, verificada a existência de defeitos ou a falta de conformidade, o dono da obra tem direito à reposição da conformidade, o que, em regra, se traduz na reparação dos defeitos sem encargos para o consumidor. Tal direito não prejudica o exercício de outros direitos independentes que não dependem de uma ordem hierárquica sucessiva, nomeadamente a substituição da obra, a redução adequada do preço e a resolução do contrato.

O Tribunal explicitou ainda que o ónus de alegar e provar o defeito ou a falta de conformidade compete à dona da obra. Para o efeito, basta a comprovação de uma das situações previstas nas alíneas do n.º 2 do artigo 22.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 84/2021, não sendo necessário demonstrar a causa do defeito. Vigora uma presunção juris tantum de falta de conformidade. Neste âmbito, resultou provado que a dona da obra demonstrou a falta de conformidade referente a telhas partidas, com tonalidades diferentes e manchas, bem como a tamancos danificados.

Considerando preenchido o conceito de falta de conformidade, o Tribunal entendeu que a dona da obra podia exercer livremente qualquer um dos direitos conferidos pelo artigo 24.º do Decreto-Lei n.º 84/2021, respeitando os limites da boa-fé, dos bons costumes e do fim social e económico do direito. Assim, o Tribunal concluiu que, ao exercer o direito à reparação que lhe assiste enquanto consumidora, a dona da obra não excedeu tais limites, não se verificando a figura do abuso de direito.

Quanto à exigência de entrega da garantia de conformidade do betão, o Tribunal decidiu tratar-se de uma questão nova suscitada em sede de recurso, ficando assim desobrigado do seu conhecimento.

Em suma, o Tribunal condenou a ré a proceder à reparação do telhado e, atenta a natureza dos trabalhos, fixou para a execução um prazo razoável que determinou ser de 60 dias, contados do trânsito em julgado, a fim de evitar o agravamento dos danos e a frustração da finalidade da obra.

Tribunal da Relação de Coimbra reforça o requisito formal substancial do suporte duradouro nas comunicações no âmbito do PERSI

O Tribunal da Relação da Coimbra, em acórdão relatado pelo Juiz Desembargador Paulo Correia, a 9 de julho, julgou parcialmente procedente o recurso de apelação no âmbito de uma ação de oposição à execução emergente do incumprimento de um contrato de crédito celebrado com dois clientes consumidores, centrando-se nas exigências do regime do PERSI, nos termos do DL nº 227/2012.

O objeto do recurso a apreciar tratava-se de saber se o Banco exequente efetuou prova de ter dado oportunidade aos executados para regularizarem a dívida no âmbito do PERSI, bem como de lhes ter apresentado uma proposta de amortização.

O Tribunal clarificou que recai sobre o banco exequente o ónus de alegar e provar ter efetuado as devidas comunicações à contraparte devedora, em estrita observância dos seus deveres de informação e proteção do cliente consumidor. Para o efeito, a instituição tem de demonstrar a comunicação, realizada em suporte duradouro, no tocante à abertura e ao encerramento do PERSI, assim como relativamente ao resultado da avaliação desenvolvida sobre a capacidade financeira do cliente bancário ou à apresentação de, pelo menos, uma proposta de regularização.

O Tribunal clarificou que cabia ao Banco exequente o ónus da alegação e prova de ter procedido às legais comunicações à contraparte devedora, em observância dos seus deveres de informação e proteção do cliente consumidor, tendo de demonstrar a comunicação, em suporte duradouro, quanto à abertura e encerramento do PERSI, bem como do resultado da avaliação desenvolvida sobre a capacidade financeira do cliente bancário ou a apresentação de, pelo menos, uma proposta de regularização.

No caso vertente, embora tenha ficado demonstrado que os contactos entre o banco exequente e os executados deixaram de ter sucesso a partir da comunicação da abertura do PERSI, o Tribunal considerou que a instituição exequente não logrou provar ter efetuado a comunicação de integração no regime em suporte duradouro.

O Tribunal sublinhou a incoerência do procedimento ao notar que carecia de justificação o facto de a abertura e o encerramento do PERSI terem sido comunicados em suporte duradouro, designadamente através de cartas enviadas para o domicílio dos clientes consumidores, enquanto o resultado da avaliação e a apresentação da proposta de regularização da dívida não o foram, uma vez que não ficou provado o envio de qualquer carta respeitante a essa fase.

Ademais, o Tribunal considerou irrelevante o facto de, no âmbito da transferência do processo de incumprimento para empresas externas de gestão e recuperação de créditos, terem sido efetuados contactos com os consumidores com vista à regularização da dívida que não culminaram em acordo.

Em suma, o Tribunal decidiu julgar procedente o recurso na parte relativa ao regime do PERSI, revogando a decisão recorrida e absolvendo os clientes consumidores da instância executiva, por inobservância do requisito de forma substancial atinente às comunicações em suporte duradouro, nos termos do Decreto-Lei n.º 227/2012.

Tribunal da Relação de Évora esclarece que a mera declaração da instituição de crédito exequente de que efetuou a integração do cliente consumidor no PERSI não supre o requisito de suporte duradouro da comunicação

Por acórdão relatado pela Juíza Desembargadora Sónia Moura, de 2 de julho, o Tribunal da Relação de Évora julgou improcedente o recurso de apelação no âmbito de uma ação executiva emergente do incumprimento de um contrato de abertura de crédito celebrado com clientes bancários consumidores, centrando-se no regime formal do PERSI, constante do DL nº 227/2012.

O objeto do recurso centrou-se em decidir se se verificava a exceção dilatória insuprível da falta de integração dos clientes bancários consumidores no PERSI.

O Tribunal começou por esclarecer que a alegação e a prova da integração do cliente bancário no PERSI, bem como da posterior extinção do procedimento, competem integralmente ao credor exequente.

Relativamente à integração no PERSI, o Tribunal considerou que a mera declaração da instituição bancária exequente de que efetuou tal integração não supre a falta de junção aos autos das cartas pertinentes, uma vez que as comunicações relativas a este procedimento têm necessariamente de ser efetuadas em suporte duradouro. Perante a inexistência dessas cartas, colocou-se a questão de saber se a prova da integração no PERSI poderia ser suprida por outros meios de prova ou por presunções judiciais, meios que habitualmente servem apenas como apoio complementar à junção das cartas.

A este propósito, o Tribunal qualificou a exigência formal da realização das comunicações em suporte escrito como um requisito ad probationem. Nestes casos, por força do disposto no Código Civil, não é legalmente admissível a prova testemunhal nem a prova por presunções judiciais, pelo que a realização das comunicações apenas poderia ser demonstrada através dos próprios documentos que as corporizam ou por confissão expressa, judicial ou extrajudicial, o que não se verificou no caso vertente.

Quanto à extinção do PERSI, o Tribunal analisou a faculdade de a instituição de crédito, por sua iniciativa, extinguir o procedimento quando seja promovida penhora sobre bens do devedor a favor de terceiros. Contudo, sublinhou que a instituição bancária não pode prescindir de apreciar concretamente se as circunstâncias do caso justificam pôr termo ao procedimento ou se, pelo contrário, não obstam ao seu prosseguimento.

Neste enquadramento, considerando que a instituição bancária beneficiava de uma hipoteca para garantia do seu crédito, uma garantia real que assegura o pagamento prioritário em relação aos demais credores que não gozem de privilégio especial ou de prioridade no registo, e verificando-se que a penhora registada era respeitante a um crédito comum, concluiu-se que a prioridade do crédito da exequente não estava colocada em crise.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou o recurso improcedente, confirmando a decisão recorrida que absolveu os clientes bancários consumidores da instância executiva, por se entender que a existência de penhora do imóvel hipotecado a favor de terceiro não torna automaticamente desnecessária nem afasta a integração imperativa dos consumidores no regime do PERSI.

Tribunal da Relação de Évora clarifica que o saldo negativo em cartão de crédito não pago por cliente consumidor pode configurar simples mora e não incumprimento definitivo para efeitos do PERSI

Em acórdão relatado pelo Juiz Desembargador Vítor Sequinho dos Santos, a 14 de julho, o Tribunal da Relação de Évora julgou procedente o recurso de apelação no âmbito de uma oposição à execução fundada no incumprimento de um contrato de utilização de cartão de crédito celebrado entre uma instituição de crédito e o cliente consumidor, centrando-se no preenchimento dos requisitos do regime do PERSI, nos termos do DL nº 227/2012.

O objeto do recurso centrou-se em verificar se a entidade exequente, ou o banco cedente do crédito, incumpriu o dever de integrar o cliente bancário consumidor no PERSI, omissão que constitui uma exceção dilatória inominada e determina a extinção da instância executiva.

O Tribunal a quo havia decidido que o incumprimento do contrato de utilização do cartão de crédito ocorrera em 2009, ou seja, antes da entrada em vigor do regime do PERSI, a 1 de janeiro de 2013. Contudo, o Tribunal da Relação entendeu que, à luz do regime transitório do Decreto-Lei n.º 227/2012, a primeira instância errou ao considerar que o contrato descrito no título executivo não estava abrangido pela aplicação do regime.

O Tribunal esclareceu que a existência de saldo negativo no cartão de crédito e a falta de pagamento da quantia em dívida por parte do cliente consumidor não configuram, por si só, um incumprimento definitivo, mas antes uma situação de simples mora. Ademais, a instituição bancária nunca alegou nem provou factos demonstrativos de que tal mora se tenha convertido em incumprimento definitivo, nos termos do artigo 808.º do Código Civil, nem que tenha operado a resolução do contrato com esse fundamento em data anterior à entrada em vigor do Decreto-Lei n.º 227/2012.

Assim, o Tribunal concluiu que o contrato em causa subsistia plenamente à data da entrada em vigor do aludido diploma, encontrando-se o consumidor apenas em mora quanto ao pagamento do saldo bancário em dívida. Deste modo, o regime do PERSI e a consequente obrigatoriedade de integração do devedor eram plenamente aplicáveis. Não tendo ficado demonstrada a realização dessa integração, a propositura da ação executiva encontrava-se legalmente vedada.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou procedentes o recurso e os embargos de executado, revogando a sentença recorrida e absolvendo o cliente consumidor da instância executiva, em virtude do preenchimento da exceção dilatória da falta de integração no PERSI.

Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães reforça a exigência rigorosa da verificação dos pressupostos da ação popular na tutela de interesses individuais homogéneos de consumidores

O Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães, no acórdão relatado pela Juíza Desembargadora Maria João Marques Pinto de Matos, a 2 de julho, julgou improcedente o recurso de apelação no âmbito de uma ação popular intentada para a defesa de direitos dos consumidores, fundamentada na alegada prática de especulação de preços, publicidade enganosa e prática comercial desleal e restritiva da concorrência, movida contra uma empresa de distribuição alimentar.

A questão que mais nos releva pautava-se por decidir se o Tribunal a quo incorrera em errada interpretação e aplicação do Direito ao julgar verificada a exceção dilatória inominada de omissão dos pressupostos próprios da ação popular quanto a um determinado produto (“pêssego paraguaio”), por considerar inexistente a necessária homogeneidade dos interesses individuais dos consumidores e por considerar que tais interesses individuais, no seu conjunto, não assumiam uma dimensão de relevância de ordem pública.

O Tribunal começou por densificar o conceito de interesses difusos em sentido estrito, definindo-os como aqueles de que todos participam pela pertença a uma comunidade, sendo indissociáveis dessa qualidade, intransmissíveis e insuscetíveis de divisão com destino a titularidades individuais ou até da fragmentação em quotas ou partes ideais. Ademais, o Tribunal reforçou as distinções concetuais entre interesses difusos stricto sensu, interesses coletivos e interesses individuais homogéneos, concluindo que o caso vertente respeitava a esta última categoria.

Nesta matéria, o Tribunal destacou que, para além da existência de um facto ilícito gerador de danos em massa, a viabilidade da tutela coletiva de interesses individuais homogéneos exige a clara prevalência dos elementos comuns sobre o “lastro de individualização” de cada consumidor lesado, bem como uma dimensão de relevância para a ordem pública que exceda a mera soma atomizada de interesses individuais atomizados.

No caso concreto, o Tribunal entendeu que a apreciação da responsabilidade civil para o pedido indemnizatório exigiria a verificação individualizada da situação de cada consumidor, nomeadamente no tocante à demonstração do dano, do nexo de causalidade, da efetiva cobrança de sobrepreço e da influência direta na decisão de consumo, prevalecendo a heterogeneidade das situações particulares e do interesses individuais sobre a matriz comum do ilícito, o que inviabiliza uma apreciação necessariamente unitária em sede de ação popular.

Adicionalmente, considerou-se que a comercialização com pretenso sobrepreço de um único bem alimentar, não qualificável como de primeira necessidade nem de largo consumo pela generalidade da população, circunscrita no tempo e ao espaço de uma única loja, carece da relevância comunitária ou dimensão social de ordem pública que justificaria o recurso ao mecanismo da ação popular. Assim, o Tribunal entendeu que devia ser respeitada a competência própria das instâncias especializadas, designadamente o Tribunal da Concorrência, Regulação e Supervisão, e das entidades administrativas de regulação e fiscalização, como a Autoridade de Segurança Alimentar e Económica, cujos meios a autora tinha ao seu dispor.

Por fim, o Tribunal afastou as inconstitucionalidades invocadas, clarificando que a exigência de preenchimento rigoroso dos pressupostos legais não constitui uma restrição indevida ao direito fundamental de ação popular ou de acesso à tutela jurisdicional efetiva, tratando-se antes de uma delimitação necessária para reconduzir o instituto ao seu âmbito próprio e evitar a sua conversão num veículo genérico para todo e qualquer litígio individual de consumo, nos termos do artigo 52.º, n.º 3, da Constituição da República Portuguesa e da Lei n.º 83/95, de 31 de agosto.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou improcedentes todos os fundamentos do recurso, confirmando integralmente a sentença recorrida que julgou verificada a exceção dilatória inominada de omissão dos pressupostos próprios da ação popular em relação ao referido bem alimentar.

Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães reforça que a presunção de culpa do empreiteiro numa empreitada de consumo não exonera o dono da obra de provar a execução defeituosa

Por acórdão relatado pelo Juiz Desembargador Joaquim Boavida, proferido a 2 de julho, o Tribunal da Relação de Guimarães julgou improcedente o recurso de apelação relativo a um litígio emergente de um contrato de empreitada de consumo com alegação de execução defeituosa.

O Tribunal considerou que ao contrato em apreço era aplicável o regime da empreitada de consumo, previsto no Decreto-Lei n.º 84/2021, de 18 de outubro. Contudo, notou que o dono da obra não pretendia exercer os direitos específicos conferidos por aquele diploma, mas sim acionar o direito de indemnização nos termos gerais da responsabilidade civil pelos prejuízos decorrentes do cumprimento defeituoso da prestação por parte da ré empreiteira.

Neste sentido, o Tribunal realçou que a obrigação de indemnizar por cumprimento defeituoso exige a demonstração, por parte do lesado, dos pressupostos gerais da responsabilidade civil contratual, com exceção da culpa, a qual se presume por força do n.º 1 do artigo 799.º do Código Civil. Do mesmo modo, esclareceu que o regime da empreitada de consumo estabelece a presunção de que a desconformidade já existia no momento da entrega do bem caso se manifeste dentro do prazo legal. Contudo, o Tribunal frisou expressamente que a existência do defeito não se presume em caso algum, constituindo um facto constitutivo do direito cuja prova compete integralmente ao dono da obra.

Aplicando tais princípios ao caso vertente, o Tribunal concluiu que o dono da obra não logrou demonstrar a existência de qualquer desconformidade na prestação executada pela ré. Embora tenha ficado provado que as infiltrações de água causaram estragos na caixa de escadas e no elevador, não foi possível apurar se essa infiltração ocorreu pela junção da tela asfáltica aplicada pela ré ou pelo próprio aro da claraboia, cuja intervenção não integrava o objeto do contrato de empreitada.

Quanto ao argumento do dono da obra de que se deveria extrair uma presunção judicial do facto de as infiltrações terem cessado após uma reparação posterior da ré, o Tribunal considerou tal ilação inadmissível. Tal deveu-se ao facto de essa reparação ter abrangido simultaneamente a zona intervencionada pela ré e a própria claraboia, subsistindo assim a dúvida quanto à real origem das infiltrações.

Deste modo, o Tribunal fundamentou que não se tratava de uma mera falta de prova da causa técnica do defeito, mas sim da própria ausência de prova da existência de um defeito imputável à prestação da ré.

Em suma, o Tribunal julgou improcedente o recurso, confirmando integralmente a sentença recorrida, com o fundamento de que a presunção de culpa do empreiteiro não exonera o dono da obra do ónus de provar a efetiva e defeituosa execução dos trabalhos, sem o qual se frustra um pressuposto essencial da responsabilidade contratual.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: July and September 2026

Jurisprudência

July and September 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations and further develop core principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in these months, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Court of Justice Clarifies Limitation Periods for Bank Restitution Claims Following Nullification of Unfair Consumer Contracts

In its judgment of 2 July 2026 (Joined Cases C-261/25 and C-262/25, Bank BPH and Raiffeisen Bank International), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interpreted Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, alongside the principles of effectiveness, proportionality, and legal certainty.

The cases arose from disputes between banks and consumers in Poland regarding mortgage loan agreements denominated in foreign currency that were declared null and void due to unfair terms. While consumers successfully sought the restitution of all payments made, the referring court sought guidance on when the limitation period begins for banks to bring counter-claims for the restitution of the original loan capital.

The Court ruled that EU law does not preclude national legal interpretations where the limitation period for a seller or supplier’s (bank’s) claim for restitution of undue payments, arising from a contract rendered void by unfair terms, begins to run from the date on which the consumer first challenged the binding nature of those terms or the contract before the bank.

The CJEU emphasized that because a contract cannot become void without the consumer’s will, a bank cannot have a valid claim for restitution before the consumer expresses an intent to invalidate the agreement. Starting the limitation period from the moment of the initial challenge ensures a fair balance between the parties, respects the principle of proportionality, prevents unjust enrichment, and satisfies legal certainty by providing clear foreseeability for both lenders and consumers.

General Court Rules Public Bodies Granting Housing Loans Qualify as “Sellers or Suppliers” under Consumer Protection Law

In its judgment of 9 July 2026 (Case C-188/25, Štátny fond rozvoja bývania v GL, KL, and SC), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified the broad scope of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts regarding public bodies and reinforced the principle of the primacy of EU law.

The case concerned a dispute between the State Housing Development Fund (ŠFRB), a public body in Slovakia providing preferential housing loans for social policy purposes, and several borrowers and guarantors whose loans were terminated early. While a national supreme court had previously ruled that the fund was exempt from consumer protection rules because it acted in the public interest on a not-for-profit basis, the regional court sought guidance from the CJEU.

The Court ruled that a public body established to carry out housing assistance through preferential loans is a “seller or supplier” under Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13, provided the loan agreements fall within the scope of its professional activity. The CJEU emphasized that the functional definition of a seller or supplier encompasses entities pursuing tasks in the public interest, and the not-for-profit nature of an organization cannot deprive natural persons of their protective rights.

Crucially, the Court held that under the principle of the primacy of EU law, a lower national court, even when bound by domestic procedural rules to follow the legal rulings of a higher court, must disregard those rulings if they conflict with an interpretation of EU law provided by the CJEU via a preliminary ruling.

Overall, the ruling reinforces strong consumer protection standards across the public sector, ensuring that citizens utilizing state-backed housing programs enjoy identical protections against unfair terms as those dealing with commercial banks, while overriding conflicting national judicial hierarchies.

Court of Justice Rules Streaming Services Qualify as “Digital Services” Subject to Right of Withdrawal

In its judgment of 9 July 2026 (Case C-234/25, Sky Österreich Fernsehen v Verein für Konsumenteninformation), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the distinction between digital content and digital services under Directive 2011/83/EU. The case involved an Austrian dispute where streaming provider Sky required subscribers to waive their 14-day withdrawal right upfront, classifying streaming as exempt digital content, while consumer association VKI argued it was a digital service.

The Court ruled that streaming services where consumers access digital data live, on demand, or offline constitute digital services rather than digital content, provided the offering is dynamic and goes beyond the mere stable supply of specific files. Unlike static digital content, streaming platforms feature continuous involvement, regular updates, tailored recommendations, and flexible access.

Because streaming qualifies as a digital service, companies cannot automatically strip consumers of their statutory 14-day right of withdrawal. However, the Court noted that traders remain protected against abuse, as consumers who cancel during the withdrawal period must pay proportionate compensation based on the economic value of the content actually consumed.

Court of Justice Rules Safety Defects Do Not Automatically Justify Contract Termination

In its judgment of 9 July 2026 (Case C-307/25, KFZ Kolak v GF), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 13(4)(c) of Directive (EU) 2019/771 on contracts for the sale of goods, clarifying the conditions under which a consumer can immediately terminate a sales contract or demand a price reduction due to a lack of conformity. The case arose from a dispute in Austria concerning the purchase of an eight-year-old second-hand vehicle that was found to have an engine oil leak affecting road safety, a defect that could nonetheless be rectified at a relatively low financial cost. Although the seller offered to repair the vehicle, the buyer demanded the immediate termination of the contract and a full refund.

The Court ruled that a lack of conformity relating to the safety of goods does not automatically have to be classified as serious under Article 13(4)(c) so as to justify an immediate price reduction or contract termination if the defect can be rectified relatively inexpensively. The CJEU emphasized that Directive 2019/771 aims to strike a balance between high consumer protection and enterprise competitiveness, meaning that denying the seller any opportunity to repair an easily fixable defect would upset the statutory hierarchy of remedies that normally prioritizes repair or replacement.

Furthermore, the Court noted that immediate termination is reserved for defects of such gravity that the consumer can no longer objectively maintain confidence in the seller’s ability to bring the goods into conformity, requiring a case-by-case assessment of factors such as the nature of the defect, the age and type of the goods, the cost of repair, and the seller’s conduct. Overall, the ruling provides a pragmatic interpretation of consumer sales law, protecting sellers’ rights to remedy easily fixable defects while preventing consumers from abusing minor or inexpensive flaws to instantly cancel contracts.

Court of Justice Rules Automatic Set-Off of Bank Claims in Void Mortgage Contracts Does Not Violate EU Law

In its judgment of 10 September 2026 (Case C-510/25, T.Z. and D.Z. v Bank S.A.), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, addressing how reciprocal financial claims must be settled when a mortgage loan is declared void due to unfair terms.

The case originated from a dispute in Poland between borrowers and a bank regarding a foreign-currency-denominated mortgage loan. When the contract was found to be invalid, a legal debate arose over whether national courts could automatically offset the bank’s right to recover the original loan capital against the consumer’s right to recover past payments (known as the “balance theory”), or whether the parties must pursue separate, independent claims (the “two claims theory”). The Polish referring court questioned whether automatic, court-driven set-offs disadvantaged consumers by limiting their claims and interest to amounts exceeding the initial capital lent.

The Court ruled that EU law does not preclude a judicial interpretation of national law under which a court proceeds to offset the reciprocal claims of the consumer and the bank of its own motion. The CJEU emphasized that while Directive 93/13 requires robust consumer protection and effective restitutory effects, it does not mandate a specific procedural mechanism for settling accounts after a contract is annulled, leaving Member States to apply their procedural autonomy.

Furthermore, the Court noted that automatic set-off ensures mutual restitution and prevents unjust enrichment for both parties, provided that the national court guarantees the consumer’s right to default interest on any excess amount, informs the consumer transparently of the legal consequences, and ensures that procedural costs do not deter consumers from asserting their rights under EU law. Overall, the ruling provides vital procedural flexibility for national courts, confirming that balancing reciprocal debts in annulled consumer contracts complies with European standards as long as the core protections of Directive 93/13 are fully upheld.

Court of Justice Rules Telecom Code Does Not Grant Unilateral Right to Change Contract Terms

In its judgment of 10 September 2026 (Case C-669/24, Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband v Vodafone), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted the first subparagraph of Article 105(4) of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (the European Electronic Communications Code), clarifying whether telecommunications providers have an automatic legal right to modify consumer contracts unilaterally. The case arose from a German consumer protection lawsuit challenging Vodafone’s general terms, which allowed the provider to change contract conditions at its discretion, subject to fairness considerations and a termination right. The provider argued that the EU Telecom Code inherently granted this right, shielding it from stricter national consumer protection reviews.

The Court ruled that the Telecom Code does not grant electronic communications providers the right to change contractual conditions unilaterally. Instead, the CJEU explained that Article 105(4) merely governs the legal consequences, specifically the end user’s right to terminate the contract without cost, when a provider exercises such a right.

The Court emphasized that the legal basis for making unilateral changes must be established by other rules under EU or national law, and that such terms remain fully subject to rigorous consumer protection frameworks like Directive 93/13 on unfair terms.

Overall, the ruling ensures that telecom providers cannot bypass national laws or consumer safeguards by misinterpreting EU termination rules as a blanket authorization.

Court of Justice Rules Energy Suppliers Cannot Unilaterally Fix Unfair Price Clauses or Limit Consumers’ Retroactive Claims

In its judgment of 24 September 2026 (Case C-900/24, SVB v Glarner Straße 5 GbR), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, severely restricting energy suppliers from modifying void pricing terms or blocking consumers from recovering long-standing overpayments.

The case arose from a long-term district heating supply contract in Germany containing opaque price adjustment clauses. When the consumer challenged the clauses as unfair and demanded a reimbursement of past overpayments spanning several years, the supplier relied on national case-law, known as the “three-year rule”, which prevents consumers from challenging price increases if not contested within three years. Additionally, the supplier attempted to unilaterally replace the void pricing clause with a supposedly compliant one.

The Court ruled that Directive 93/13 precludes national legislation or judicial practices under which an energy supply contract remains bound by price increases unless the consumer challenged them within a strict three-year window. The CJEU emphasized that maintaining the effects of an unfair pricing clause undermines the core restitutory and deterrent objectives of EU consumer protection law.

Furthermore, the Court held that suppliers cannot unilaterally amend or replace an unfair price adjustment clause with future effect. Such practices would rob the invalidation of its dissuasive effect, leaving suppliers free to use unfair terms secure in the knowledge that courts could simply rewrite the contract for them. Overall, the ruling reinforces robust consumer rights in long-term utility contracts, ensuring full retroactive reimbursement for unfair price hikes and banning unilateral corporate contract repairs.

Court of Justice Rules Contracts Concluded Off-Premises via Pre-Sent Offers Still Grant Withdrawal Rights

In its judgment of 24 September 2026 (Case C-381/25, PL and GQ v Gexx aeroSol), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 2(8)(a) of Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, clarifying the definition of an off-premises contract when a trader sends a written offer in advance that is later accepted by the consumer away from business premises. The case involved German consumers who signed a contract for a photovoltaic system at home after receiving a written offer from the solar company. When the consumers later attempted to exercise their 14-day right of withdrawal, the company argued that the contract did not qualify as off-premises because the offer was sent beforehand.

The Court ruled that a contract constitutes an off-premises contract whenever it is concluded in the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer away from the trader’s business premises, even if a written offer was sent in advance. The CJEU explained that under EU law, a contract is concluded upon acceptance, and as long as that final acceptance occurs away from business premises, the statutory definition is met.

The Court emphasized that the core rationale for off-premises protection is the potential psychological pressure consumers face when dealing face-to-face with a trader at home. Even if an advance offer removes the element of surprise, the physical presence of the trader during final acceptance still exposes the consumer to undue pressure, meaning prior paperwork does not strip consumers of their statutory withdrawal rights.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: June 2026

Jurisprudência

June 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations and further develop core principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in this month, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

General Court Annuls Meta’s Marketplace Designation under the Digital Markets Act

In its judgment of 3 June 2026 (Case T-1078/23, Meta Platforms, Inc. v European Commission), the General Court of the European Union clarified the limits the Commission faces when classifying and designating core platform services under the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

The case concerned a Commission decision designating Meta as a gatekeeper and classifying its services, Messenger and Marketplace, as distinct core platform services and important gateways for business users to reach end users.

The Court held that while the designation of Messenger was valid, the Commission made an error of law regarding Marketplace. The Court clarified that the qualitative assessment for classifying a service must be based on the factual circumstances existing at the exact time of the decision’s adoption, rather than being restricted to the retrospective three-year period used for calculating quantitative thresholds.

Importantly, the Court stressed that the Commission failed in its obligation to state reasons by not properly evaluating significant changes Meta implemented on Marketplace on 31 July 2023. Failing to rigorously analyze these limitations, which restricted the number of permitted listings, was considered incompatible with the Commission’s duty to conduct a diligent and impartial examination based on the most complete and reliable information possible.

The judgment also underlines that the mere fact that quantitative user thresholds were largely exceeded in the previous three years does not automatically justify a designation, especially when recent factual changes limit how business users can offer goods to consumers on the platform.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between regulating major tech platforms and ensuring procedural fairness, annulling the Marketplace designation and limiting the Commission’s ability to base decisions on insufficient reasoning or outdated factual scenarios.

CJEU Clarifies Liability Regime for Passenger Injuries on Package Cruises

In its judgment of 4 June 2026 (Case C-629/24, MH v Costa Crociere SpA), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the rules governing liability when a passenger sustains personal injury on a cruise ship.

The case concerned preliminary rulings regarding passengers who suffered injuries on board. The core issue was whether compensation claims should be governed by the strict liability regime for package travel under Directive 90/314 or the specific liability limits established by Regulation 392/2009 and the Athens Convention.

The Court held that when a cruise is sold as a package, actions for damages relating to injuries sustained during the carriage by sea are governed by the maritime carrier liability regime. The Court clarified that this applies to the entire period the passenger is on board, without needing to distinguish whether the injury resulted from transport, accommodation, or recreation services.

Importantly, the Court stressed that while organizers are liable to consumers for the proper performance of a package contract, they are entitled to rely on the compensation limits provided by the Athens Convention. Therefore, the specific liability caps for death or personal injury occurring on a ship take precedence over the general package travel rules.

The judgment also underlines that passengers have the choice to bring an action either against the cruise organizer or directly against the performing carrier, but they cannot obtain compensation exceeding the actual loss suffered through multiple claims.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between ensuring adequate protection for travelers and maintaining harmonized international liability limits for the maritime transport industry, clarifying the intersection between package travel regulations and maritime law.

CJEU Clarifies Rules on Default Interest for Voided Consumer Contracts

In its judgment of 11 June 2026 (Case C-903/24, Zmarka), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the rules on awarding statutory default interest when a contract is annulled due to unfair terms.

The case concerned a voided foreign currency loan where the core issue was whether default interest accrues from a general payment demand or only from a demand specifying the exact amount claimed.

The Court held that requiring the specific amount to be stated in an extrajudicial or procedural document to trigger default interest does not violate Directive 93/13 or the principle of effectiveness.

Importantly, the Court stressed that this requirement does not place an excessive burden on consumers, as they can easily verify paid installments through bank records or by requesting a certificate.

The judgment also underlines that this rule applies independently of specific case circumstances, even when individuals are represented by legal counsel

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between consumer protection and fair procedural standards, confirming that specifying claim amounts is a valid prerequisite for obtaining default interest on voided agreements.

CJEU Clarifies Rules on Basic Payment Accounts and Anti-Money Laundering Checks

In its judgment of 11 June 2026 (Case C-81/24, LH v OTP banka d.d.), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the limits banks face when refusing to open basic payment accounts due to anti-money laundering regulations.

The case concerned a bank’s refusal to open a basic account for an individual solely because the applicant was included on the United States OFAC list, a restrictive measures list maintained by a third country.

The Court held that EU law does not permit credit institutions to automatically reject applications based purely on such third-country lists. The Court clarified that being on an external sanctions list does not inherently prohibit establishing a business relationship under Directive 2015/849.

Importantly, the Court stressed that while inclusion on such a list is a relevant risk factor, banks are required to conduct an individual assessment of the actual money laundering or terrorist financing risks. A refusal is only justified if this personalized assessment shows the risk cannot be effectively managed through proportionate measures.

The judgment also underlines that anti-money laundering rules cannot be used as a pretext to create unjustified barriers for consumers seeking access to the financial system, particularly given the inherently lower risk of accounts with limited features.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between preventing financial crime and ensuring financial inclusion, confirming that automatic account denials based on foreign sanctions lists are incompatible with EU law without a proper risk evaluation.

CJEU Clarifies Exemptions for Importing Protected Species in Consumer Medicines

In its judgment of 11 June 2026 (Case C-601/24, Gotka), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the rules governing the importation of medicinal products containing protected species of wild fauna and flora.

The case concerned criminal proceedings against an individual who introduced tablets containing Japanese seahorse extract into the EU from a third country without an import permit, intended purely for personal therapeutic use.

The Court held that while such a complex preparation is considered a specimen under EU law, it can qualify for the personal or household effects exemption. The Court clarified that classifying a product as a medicinal product does not exclude it from the scope of wildlife protection regulations.

Importantly, the Court stressed that the absence of a commercial purpose is a decisive criterion. Therefore, consumers who lawfully purchase such products abroad for their own medical needs or those of a close relative are exempt from presenting an import permit, provided specific customs conditions are met.

The judgment also underlines that Member States cannot impose criminal sanctions on individuals importing these products if this personal effects derogation applies. If the exemption does not apply, any criminal penalty imposed must strictly comply with the principle of proportionality.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between ensuring the conservation of endangered species and protecting individuals acting without commercial intent, preventing the unjustified criminalization of cross-border personal purchases.

CJEU Clarifies Temporal Application of Rules on Non-Performing Loans

In its judgment of 11 June 2026 (Case C-65/25, IFIS NPL INVESTING), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the temporal scope of EU rules regarding non-performing loans and anti-money laundering supervision.

The case concerned bulk assignments of non-performing loans under older national legislation that required neither written contracts nor prudential supervision, applicable before the deadline for transposing Directive 2021/2167.

The Court held that the EU framework on credit purchasers does not apply retroactively to transfers occurring before the 29 December 2023 transposition deadline.

Importantly, the Court stressed that general anti-money laundering rules apply only to specific entities, which exclude purchasers of non-performing loans. Therefore, while consumers now enjoy stronger protections under the new framework, these strict requirements cannot be imposed on prior assignments.

The judgment also underlines that general EU principles, such as transparency and good faith, are inapplicable, as the older national legislation did not implement EU law.

Overall, the ruling reinforces legal certainty, confirming that national rules lacking strict written form and supervision for loan assignments are permitted if the facts occurred before the new directives became applicable

CJEU Clarifies Limits on National Restrictions for Cross-Border Digital Services

In its judgment of 16 June 2026 (Joined Cases C-188/24 and C-190/24), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the limits Member States face when regulating information society services originating from other EU countries.

The cases concerned French legislation requiring pornographic websites to implement age verification, and rules prohibiting navigation apps from rebroadcasting police roadside checks.

The Court held that while criminal laws and public policy measures fall within the EU’s harmonized framework, Member States generally cannot impose broad, abstract criminal obligations on service providers established in other Member States.

Importantly, the Court stressed that national authorities may still take targeted measures against specific providers. Requiring a specific platform to use age verification or prohibiting a navigation app from sharing roadside check data is permitted if proportionate and procedurally valid. This ensures that vulnerable consumers, such as minors, receive adequate protection without imposing unlawful general monitoring obligations.

The judgment also underlines that platforms actively controlling content visibility through algorithms cannot claim the liability exemptions reserved for neutral hosting services.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between the free movement of digital services and the protection of public security, clarifying when national authorities can lawfully restrict cross-border online platforms

CJEU Strikes Down Hungarian Mandatory Price Reductions for Food Retailers

In its judgment of 18 June 2026 (Case C-658/24, Penny Market), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the limits Member States face when imposing mandatory price reductions and minimum stock obligations on large food retailers.

The case concerned Hungarian emergency legislation requiring food retailers with a turnover exceeding EUR 2.5 million to reduce prices of certain basic products by at least 15% and to maintain mandatory stock levels.

The Court held that such legislation is precluded by the EU’s common agricultural market rules and the Services Directive, as imposing mandatory prices fundamentally undermines the free formation of selling prices and fair competition.

Importantly, the Court stressed that while combating inflation and protecting disadvantaged consumers are legitimate goals, targeting only large retailers fails to achieve them systematically, leaving many vulnerable shoppers without access to these discounted goods.

The judgment also underlines that these requirements likely constitute indirect discrimination, as the turnover thresholds primarily penalized foreign-owned companies while allowing large domestic retail franchises to effectively escape the rules.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the integrity of the EU internal market, confirming that national emergency interventions cannot unjustifiably disrupt harmonized agricultural pricing mechanisms or impose discriminatory burdens on cross-border businesses.

CJEU Clarifies Consumer Protection Scope for Financial Contracts for Differences

In its judgment of 18 June 2026 (Case C-346/25, FIBO Markets), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the scope of conflict-of-law rules regarding financial instruments and consumer contracts under the Rome I Regulation.

The case concerned a dispute over a financial contract for differences (CFD), focusing on whether a framework contract’s rules allowing a broker to modify or delay orders fall under an exception that excludes financial instruments from the general consumer protection regime.

The Court held that while the core elements determining the price difference of a CFD constitute a financial instrument, the terms of a framework contract governing order execution and potential price modifications do not.

Importantly, the Court stressed that expanding this exception to cover framework execution terms would unlawfully deprive consumers of the mandatory legal protections afforded by the law of their habitual residence.

The judgment also underlines that this exception must be interpreted strictly, as CFDs are complex and highly speculative products that expose retail clients to significant risks. Overall, the ruling reinforces investor protection in cross-border financial services, confirming that brokers cannot use broad framework clauses to bypass the protective laws of a client’s home country.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: May 2026

Jurisprudência

May 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations and further develop core principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in this month, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Presence of Pest Traces in Food Premises May Suffice to Establish Breach of EU Hygiene Obligations: CJEU Clarifies Scope of Food Business Operators’ Responsibility

In its judgment of 13 May 2026 (Case C-483/24, Aldi SA), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Regulation 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs in the context of repeated findings of rodent droppings, pest traces, and contaminated products in food shops and warehouses.

The Court held that, under EU food hygiene law, the finding by competent authorities of traces and droppings of pests in food business premises may, in itself, be sufficient to establish an infringement of certain hygiene obligations, without the need to additionally prove that the operator failed to take all possible preventive measures.

The Court emphasized that Regulation 852/2004 pursues a high level of consumer protection and food safety, and that food business operators bear the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with hygiene requirements throughout the food chain.

In particular, the Court clarified that the repeated presence of pests or contamination in shops and storage facilities demonstrates a breach of obligations relating to the protection of food against contamination and the implementation of adequate pest-control procedures. The Court also confirmed that HACCP-based procedures do not relieve operators from compliance with the general hygiene obligations laid down in Annex II of the Regulation.

However, regarding the structural requirements of food premises, the Court distinguished that the mere presence of pests is not automatically sufficient to establish a breach. In such cases, it must also be shown that the characteristics of the premises themselves prevent the implementation of proper hygiene practices.

Overall, the judgment reinforces that EU food hygiene rules impose strict responsibilities on food business operators, reflecting the fundamental objective of ensuring food safety and protecting public health.

Traders Must Inform Consumers About Possible Customs Formalities and Duties in International Transport Contracts: CJEU Clarifies Scope of Pre-Contractual Information Duties

In its judgment of 13 May 2026 (Case C-488/24, D.V. v Kigas MB), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 5(1)(a) and (c) of Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights in the context of an international carriage contract involving customs duties imposed on goods transported from Norway to Lithuania.

The Court held that, in contracts for the international carriage of goods, traders must inform consumers that customs formalities may need to be completed and that customs duties may be payable when goods are imported into the European Union.

The Court emphasized that such information forms part of the main characteristics of the service and is essential for consumers before deciding whether to conclude the contract, since customs procedures and duties may significantly affect both the performance and the overall cost of the transport service.

However, the Court clarified that EU law does not require traders to provide detailed information on the precise customs documents to be submitted or on the exact rates and amounts of customs duties applicable. According to the Court, imposing such an obligation would be disproportionate, particularly because those duties may depend on factors unknown at the time the contract is concluded.

The judgment also confirms that customs duties constitute additional charges within the meaning of Directive 2011/83, meaning that traders must at least inform consumers that such charges may arise, even where their exact amount cannot reasonably be calculated in advance.

CJEU Limits National Notification Duties for Imported Food Supplements

In its judgment of 21 May 2026 (Case C-626/24, PRAGON s. r. o. v Státní zemědělská a potravinářská inspekce), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the limits Member States face when imposing prior notification obligations on operators importing food supplements from other EU countries.

The case concerned Czech legislation requiring operators to notify authorities at least 24 hours in advance of the arrival of food supplements imported from another Member State, in order to facilitate official food safety controls.

The Court held that Article 9(7) of Regulation 2017/625 fully harmonises the conditions under which Member States may require such notifications. Under that provision, prior notification obligations are permitted only where they are strictly necessary for the organisation of official controls.

Importantly, the Court stressed that such measures must remain exceptional and proportionate. A general and systematic obligation applying to all imported food supplements was considered incompatible with EU law, particularly given the existence of less restrictive mechanisms for ensuring food safety, including risk-based controls, information-sharing systems between Member States, and existing notification mechanisms under EU food supplement legislation.

The judgment also underlines that the mere fact that products originate from another Member State does not automatically justify stricter controls, since those goods are already subject to harmonised EU food safety rules.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between consumer and public health protection and the free movement of goods within the EU internal market, while limiting Member States’ ability to impose broad administrative burdens on intra-EU trade.

The CJEU Rejects Greek Restrictions on Online Sales of Non-Prescription Medicines

In its judgment of 21 May 2026 (Case C-604/24, Farmakeio YZ & Sia OE v Ypourgos Anaptyxis kai Ependyseon and Ypourgos Ygeias), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the limits Member States face when regulating the online sale of non-prescription medicinal products.

The case concerned Greek legislation allowing certified online pharmacies to sell at a distance only a limited subcategory of non-prescription medicines, namely “over-the-counter” products, while excluding other non-prescription medicines from online sale.

The Court held that Article 85c(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/83 precludes such legislation. According to the Court, the directive requires Member States to ensure that all non-prescription medicinal products may in principle be sold online, while permitting prohibitions only for prescription medicines.

The Greek Government justified the restriction on grounds such as overmedication, counterfeit medicines, and the lack of direct pharmacist supervision in online sales. While the Court accepted that these objectives relate to public health protection and consumer safety, it stressed that Member States must adopt proportionate measures and cannot impose restrictions that effectively eliminate online sales of certain non-prescription medicines.

Overall, the ruling reinforces the balance between public health protection and the free movement of goods and services within the EU, while limiting Member States’ ability to impose broad restrictions on cross-border online pharmaceutical sales.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: April 2026

Jurisprudência

April 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in this month, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Consumer Acknowledgment Can Interrupt Limitation Periods: CJEU Clarifies Effects in Unfair Contract Cases

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-901/24, Falucka), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC in the context of restitution claims following the invalidity of consumer contracts containing unfair terms. The case concerned proceedings between mBank and several consumers after a mortgage loan agreement was declared void due to unfair terms, raising the question whether a consumer’s acknowledgment of debt, made during litigation, can interrupt the limitation period for the bank’s restitution claim.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude national rules under which such an acknowledgment interrupts the limitation period. It reasoned that this does not undermine the effectiveness of consumer protection, since the invalidity of unfair terms must restore the parties to their original position, which may include mutual restitution. The Court emphasized that the consumer’s right to restitution remains intact, and that allowing interruption of limitation periods does not make it excessively difficult to exercise rights under EU law.

Importantly, the Court clarified that a consumer’s informed acknowledgment, made after being advised of the legal consequences of contract invalidation, may validly produce legal effects, including restarting limitation periods. It rejected the argument that such acknowledgments inherently disadvantage consumers, noting that consumers must be properly informed, but not exhaustively instructed on all procedural consequences, such as limitation rules.

The Court also found that this approach is consistent with the principles of legal certainty and the right of access to a court, as it allows sellers or suppliers to rely on consumer statements when deciding whether to initiate legal action. Such rules ensure predictability and fairness in legal relations, without compromising the protective purpose of Directive 93/13.

Overall, the judgment confirms that consumer protection under EU law does not exclude procedural consequences flowing from a consumer’s own informed statements, and that national limitation rules, when applied proportionately, remain compatible with the Directive’s objectives.

Online Gambling Restrictions and Restitution of Losses: CJEU Confirms Compatibility with EU Law

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-440/23, FB), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 56 TFEU in the context of national restrictions on online gambling and claims for restitution of losses incurred under unlawful gambling contracts. The case concerned proceedings between a consumer and Malta-based online gambling operators, raising questions about whether German legislation prohibiting certain online games of chance, such as slot machines and secondary lotteries, was compatible with the freedom to provide services.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude national legislation imposing a general prohibition on specific forms of online gambling, even where other types of gambling are permitted, including land-based games and certain licensed online activities like sports betting. It reasoned that Member States retain broad discretion in regulating gambling to protect consumers and prevent fraud and addiction, and that differences in regulatory treatment between types of games do not, in themselves, undermine the consistency or proportionality of such legislation.

The Court emphasized that the existence of demand for prohibited online gambling services, or the fact that similar services are lawfully offered in other Member States, does not invalidate national restrictions. It also clarified that a later legislative shift towards a licensing system does not retroactively affect the legality or consequences of a prior prohibition, including during transitional regulatory periods.

Importantly, the Court confirmed that contracts concluded in breach of such national prohibitions may be considered void under applicable national law, and that consumers may seek restitution of losses incurred. It rejected the argument that such claims constitute an abuse of rights, noting that restitution arises from national contract law and reflects the consequences of illegality, rather than reliance on EU law itself.

Overall, the judgment reaffirms the wide regulatory autonomy of Member States in the gambling sector and confirms that national rules on contract nullity and restitution, when applied consistently with EU law, do not infringe the freedom to provide services.

Bank Restitution Actions May Interrupt Limitation Periods Despite Parallel Invalidity Proceedings: CJEU Clarifies Consumer Protection Limits

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-752/24, Jangielak), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, together with the principles of effectiveness, proportionality, legal certainty and the right of access to a court, in the context of restitution claims following the invalidity of consumer credit agreements containing unfair terms. The case concerned proceedings between mBank and consumers after a mortgage loan agreement indexed to the Swiss franc was challenged for containing unfair terms, raising the question whether a bank’s action for restitution, brought before the final outcome of separate invalidity proceedings initiated by consumers, can interrupt the limitation period.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude national rules under which the bringing of such a restitution action interrupts the limitation period, even where parallel proceedings on the invalidity of the contract are still ongoing. It reasoned that this mechanism is compatible with the objective of Directive 93/13, since the invalidity of unfair terms requires restoring the parties to their original position, which may include mutual restitution obligations.

The Court emphasized that consumer protection does not exclude the bank’s right to seek restitution, as denying such a possibility could infringe the principle of proportionality and lead to unjust enrichment of the consumer. It also stressed that allowing interruption of limitation periods ensures effective judicial protection and access to a court for the seller or supplier, maintaining a fair balance between the parties.

Importantly, the Court clarified that the mere obligation for consumers to defend themselves in restitution proceedings does not make the exercise of their rights excessively difficult, provided that national courts ensure procedural safeguards. In particular, courts must verify that costs are not disproportionately high and may, where appropriate, stay proceedings to avoid undermining consumer protection.

The Court further found that such rules are consistent with the principle of legal certainty, as they ensure predictability in legal relations by allowing limitation periods to be interrupted through judicial actions in a uniform manner.

Overall, the judgment confirms that Directive 93/13 does not prevent national procedural rules that allow banks to interrupt limitation periods through restitution actions, even during ongoing invalidity proceedings, provided that consumer rights are not rendered excessively difficult or impossible to exercise.

Equity May Justify Allowing Time-Barred Bank Claims: CJEU Sets Limits Under Consumer Law

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-753/24, Rzepacz), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC does not preclude national rules allowing courts, in exceptional circumstances, to grant a bank’s restitution claim even after the limitation period has expired, where equity so requires.

The Court emphasized that the invalidity of unfair terms entails restoring the parties to their original position, including mutual restitution, and that fully excluding the bank’s claim could breach the principle of proportionalityand lead to unjust enrichment.

However, such exceptions must remain strictly limited, based on objective criteria, and applied so that they do not make it excessively difficult for consumers to exercise their rights, particularly by avoiding disproportionate costs.

Overall, the ruling confirms that equity-based exceptions to limitation periods are permissible, provided they do not undermine effective consumer protection under EU law.

Non-Publication of ISO Standards Does Not Preclude Their Enforceability Where Access Is Ensured: CJEU Clarifies Rule of Law Requirements

In its judgment of 21 April 2026 (Case C-155/24, Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40/EU in light of the principle of the rule of law, legal certainty, and free access to EU law, in the context of measuring tobacco emissions. The case concerned whether ISO standards referenced in EU legislation, but not published in the Official Journal, can be enforced against individuals.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude the enforceability of such ISO standards where individuals have had actual access to their official and authentic content, even if they were not formally published. In such cases, individuals cannot rely on alternative measurement methods to challenge compliance with emission limits.

The Court emphasized that free and effective access to legal rules is a core requirement of the rule of law under Article 2 TEU. Therefore, standards incorporated into EU law must be accessible in a general, non-discriminatory, and free-of-charge manner, ensuring that individuals can verify compliance and enforce their rights.

Importantly, the Court clarified that once such access is guaranteed, the absence of formal publication in the Official Journal does not undermine the binding nature of those standards. At the same time, it stressed that the EU must ensure access to these standards, even where they are protected by intellectual property rights, due to an overriding public interest.

Overall, the judgment confirms that non-publication of technical standards does not prevent their application, provided that effective access is ensured, thereby safeguarding both legal certainty and a high level of public health protection under EU law.

Charging Interest on Credit Costs Is Precluded Under EU Law: CJEU Clarifies Scope of “Total Amount of Credit”

In its judgment of 23 April 2026 (Case C-744/24, P.W. v Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A.), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 3(g) and (j) and Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC in the context of consumer credit agreements involving financed insurance premiums. The case concerned whether a lender may apply interest not only to the amount actually disbursed to the consumer, but also to costs associated with the credit, such as insurance premiums.

The Court held that EU law precludes such a practice. Interest, defined as the “borrowing rate”, may be applied only to the amount of credit actually made available to the consumer, and not to sums forming part of the total cost of the credit, even where those costs are financed as part of the agreement.

The Court emphasized the strict distinction established by Directive 2008/48 between the “total amount of credit” and the “total cost of the credit to the consumer”. Costs such as insurance premiums, particularly where they are required to obtain the credit on advertised terms, fall within the latter category and cannot be treated as part of the credit drawn down.

Importantly, the Court clarified that this prohibition applies regardless of whether the relevant sums are physically transferred to the consumer or paid directly to third parties. The classification of such amounts depends on their economic function within the credit agreement, not on the method of disbursement.

Overall, the judgment confirms that lenders cannot circumvent EU consumer protection rules by artificially inflating the base on which interest is calculated. By excluding credit costs from the interest-bearing amount, the ruling reinforces transparency, ensures comparability of credit offers, and safeguards a high level of consumer protection under EU law.

Consumers May Enforce Rights Against Transferee Banks: CJEU Confirms Limits Under Directive 93/13

In its judgment of 23 April 2026 (Case C-761/24, HM and JD v AXA Bank Belgium SA and Others), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the application of Directive 93/13/EEC to loan agreements transferred between credit institutions.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude requiring consumers to assert their rights only against the transferee of a contract, as long as this does not make those rights impossible or excessively difficult to exercise.

It stressed that the concept of “seller or supplier” includes transferee banks, and that all legal consequences of unfair terms must remain enforceable against them under the same conditions as against the original lender.

Overall, the judgment confirms that contract transfers cannot undermine consumer protection, and rights must remain fully effective after the transfer.

Nota crítica ao acórdão Staubsaugerservice (C‑62/25)

Jurisprudência

No acórdão Staubsaugerservice (C-62/25), de 26 de março, o Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia (TJUE) debruça-se sobre uma questão central do direito do consumo: o que deve estar incluído no preço apresentado ao consumidor?

O caso dizia respeito à venda online de sacos para aspirador. O produto era anunciado por € 14,90, com referências a “entrega gratuita” e “portes grátis”. Ao lado do preço, surgia um asterisco, que remetia para outra página, onde se explicava que poderiam ser cobradas “despesas de processamento” se o valor total da encomenda não atingisse um determinado valor. Quando o consumidor colocava o bem no carrinho, aparecia então um acréscimo de € 3,95, identificado como “sobretaxa por pequena quantidade”.

A questão submetida ao TJUE era a de saber se estas despesas de processamento deveriam ser incluídas no “preço de venda”, na aceção do art. 2.º-a) da Diretiva 98/6/CE, relativa à indicação dos preços dos produtos oferecidos aos consumidores.

A resposta do Tribunal é negativa. Segundo o TJUE, esses custos não têm de ser incluídos no preço de venda se variarem em função do valor global da encomenda e só forem devidos abaixo de um montante mínimo, desde que sejam claramente indicados e que esse limiar não torne, na prática, o seu pagamento inevitável.

A decisão não convence.

O primeiro problema está na própria qualificação destas chamadas “despesas de processamento”. O que são exatamente? Não parecem corresponder a despesas de transporte, entrega ou expedição, até porque o próprio site anunciava a gratuitidade da entrega e dos portes. Também não parecem corresponder a um serviço acessório autónomo pedido pelo consumidor. Na realidade, funcionam como uma parcela do montante exigido pelo profissional quando o consumidor compra apenas aquele bem ou compra abaixo de certo valor. Nesse sentido, tudo indica que deveriam ser tratadas como parte do preço.

Dito de outro modo: se o profissional pretende incentivar compras de valor mais elevado, pode fazê-lo através de um desconto ou de uma vantagem para encomendas acima de determinado limiar. O que não deveria poder fazer é o inverso: anunciar um preço mais baixo e acrescentar depois um valor adicional se o consumidor não atingir esse limiar. Essa construção é artificial e contrária à lógica da transparência. O que surge apresentado como “despesa de processamento” parece ser, em substância, a forma invertida de uma política de desconto.

O segundo problema está no raciocínio do Tribunal quanto ao caráter “evitável” destes custos. O TJUE entende que não são obrigatoriamente suportados pelo consumidor porque este os pode evitar se comprar mais produtos e atingir um valor mínimo de encomenda. O ponto relevante consiste, no entanto, em saber se, para comprar aquele bem nas condições em que ele lhe é apresentado, esse montante é ou não inevitável.

Se o consumidor quiser comprar apenas um pacote de sacos para aspirador anunciado por € 14,90 e tiver de pagar mais € 3,95, então esse valor é, na prática, parte do custo de aquisição daquele bem. A circunstância de o consumidor poder evitá-lo comprando mais não elimina essa realidade. Apenas revela a função económica do mecanismo: aumentar o valor médio das encomendas.

O terceiro ponto, talvez o mais importante, diz respeito à transparência. A Diretiva 98/6/CE tem um objetivo muito claro: melhorar a informação dos consumidores e facilitar a comparação dos preços. O art. 4.º-1 exige que o preço de venda seja inequívoco, facilmente identificável e perfeitamente legível. Ora, tal não parece verificar-se neste caso.

O consumidor não vê logo o preço total a pagar. Vê um preço e um asterisco e, eventualmente, uma remissão para outra página. Para perceber quanto terá efetivamente de pagar, tem de detetar esse sinal, abrir a página, interpretar as condições relativas ao valor da encomenda e fazer o cálculo. Isto não é transparência. É fragmentação da informação sobre o preço.

É, aliás, difícil aceitar a ideia de que esta apresentação favorece a comparabilidade dos preços. Pelo contrário: se uma loja anuncia o produto por € 14,90 e outra por € 15,90, a primeira parece mais vantajosa. Mas se, na primeira, acrescem € 3,95, a conclusão inverte-se. A comparação é falseada precisamente porque o preço apresentado ao consumidor não corresponde ao montante que este terá de pagar na compra em causa.

Em suma, o acórdão Staubsaugerservice adota uma perspetiva excessivamente formal sobre o conceito de preço de venda e enfraquece as exigências de transparência na comunicação do preço ao consumidor.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: March 2026

Jurisprudência

March 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations and further develop core principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in this month, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Consumer Assistance Does Not Preclude Distance Contract Status, but Withdrawal May Be Abusive

In its judgment of 5 March 2026 (Case C-564/24), the Court of Justice interpreted key provisions of Directive 2011/83/EU concerning the notion of a distance contract and the right of withdrawal. The case concerned a dispute between Eisenberger Gerüstbau GmbH and a consumer (JK), who, after concluding a contract for scaffolding works through an architect acting on her behalf, sought to withdraw from that contract and recover payments already made. The referring German court asked whether the involvement of a trader assisting the consumer affected the classification of the contract and the applicability of consumer protection rules. The Court held that the fact that a consumer is assisted by another trader — even where that trader initiates contact with the service provider and influences key contractual terms — is not relevant for determining whether the contract qualifies as a “distance contract” within the meaning of Article 2(7). Nor does such assistance affect the consumer’s status, which must be assessed objectively by reference to the purpose of the contract. The Court further clarified that an addendum concluded exclusively through means of distance communication may itself constitute a distance contract, even if the main contract does not, provided the conditions laid down in the directive are met. Finally, the Court ruled that, although consumers benefit from a broad right of withdrawal, its exercise may, in exceptional circumstances, be considered abusive. This may be the case where the consumer withdraws at the end of an extended withdrawal period after the services have already been fully performed, with the intention of avoiding payment. However, such abuse must be established by the national court on the basis of all the circumstances, including both objective and subjective elements. This decision is discussed here.

Reduced VAT for Accommodation May Exclude Ancillary Services Without Breaching EU Law

In its judgment of 5 March 2026 (Joined Cases C-409/24 to C-411/24), the Court of Justice interpreted Article 98 of Directive 2006/112/EC concerning reduced VAT rates and their application to accommodation services supplied to consumers. The cases concerned disputes between German hotel operators and tax authorities, where services such as breakfast, parking, Wi-Fi, and wellness access were provided together with short-term accommodation and paid for by consumers under a single price. The referring court asked whether EU law precludes national rules requiring those services to be separated and taxed at the standard rate, even where they are ancillary to the principal accommodation supply. The Court held that EU law does not preclude such national legislation. It confirmed that, although ancillary services may form part of a single economic supply from the perspective of consumers, Member States may apply reduced VAT rates selectively to specific aspects of the categories listed in Annex III. Accordingly, accommodation services supplied to consumers may be distinguished from other services provided alongside them, provided that this distinction is based on objective criteria. The Court also clarified that the classification of a transaction as a single supply is not decisive where such discretion is exercised. Finally, the Court emphasized that the principle of fiscal neutrality must be respected. This requires that similar services from the perspective of consumers — such as breakfast or parking offered independently — are not treated differently for VAT purposes. Therefore, excluding ancillary services from the reduced rate is permissible, provided that they are subject to the same standard rate whether supplied independently or together with accommodation. The final assessment remains for the national court.

Virtual Game Currency Is Not VAT-Exempt and Must Be Fully Taxed, with No Special Treatment for Consumers

In its judgment of 5 March 2026 (Case C-472/24), the Court of Justice interpreted provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC concerning VAT exemptions for currency transactions and the concept of vouchers. The case concerned a dispute between MB “Žaidimų valiuta” and the Lithuanian tax authority regarding the VAT treatment of transactions involving the purchase and resale of virtual currency (“Gold”) used in the online game Runescape, including implications for consumers engaging in such exchanges. The referring body asked whether those transactions could be exempt as currency operations or treated as multi-purpose vouchers, and how the taxable amount should be calculated. The Court held that virtual game currency such as “Gold” does not fall within the VAT exemption for currency transactions under Article 135(1)(e), since it is not accepted as an alternative means of payment outside the game and does not function as a genuine currency for consumers in the wider economy. It further clarified that such virtual units cannot be classified as vouchers within the meaning of Article 30a, because they do not entitle consumers to receive distinct goods or services but instead constitute the very digital service consumed within the game. Consequently, the transactions must be treated as taxable supplies of electronic services. Finally, the Court ruled that VAT must be calculated on the full amount received for the sale of the virtual currency, rather than only on the trader’s margin, meaning that no preferential calculation method applies even where consumers are involved in the transaction chain.

Limitation Periods and Consumer Awareness: CJEU Strengthens Protection Against Unfair Terms in Foreign Currency Loans

In its judgment of 19 March 2026 (Case C-679/24), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Articles 1 and 7 of Directive 93/13/EEC concerning the effectiveness of consumer protection in relation to limitation periods for claims based on unfair terms. The case arose from a dispute in Hungary between a consumer and financial institutions regarding a foreign-currency loan agreement containing a clause placing exchange rate risk entirely on the consumer. The referring court asked whether EU law precludes national rules under which a consumer’s claim for the legal consequences of the invalidity of such an agreement is subject to a five-year limitation period running from the date of conclusion of the contract, and whether judicial decisions could affect the starting point or suspension of that period. The Court held that EU law precludes a judicial interpretation of national law under which such a limitation period begins to run from the date the contract was concluded, where the consumer was not aware and could not reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of the term at that time. It emphasized that such a rule risks making the exercise of consumer rights excessively difficult, contrary to the principle of effectiveness. The Court further clarified that the date of judgments of the Court of Justice or national supreme courts cannot be used to determine the starting point or resumption of the limitation period, since consumers cannot be expected to monitor or interpret case-law developments in order to assert their rights. Only a final judicial decision concerning the specific consumer, duly notified, may establish awareness sufficient to trigger the limitation period. The final assessment of whether the consumer could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness remains for the national court.

“Final Price”… but with Conditions: CJEU Clarifies When Extra Fees Stay Outside the Listed Price

In its judgment of 26 March 2026 (Case C-62/25), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 2(a) of Directive 98/6/EC concerning the concept of ‘selling price’ in the context of online sales. The case arose from a dispute in Germany between a consumer protection association and an online retailer regarding whether flat-rate processing fees, charged only when the total order value falls below a certain threshold, must be included in the advertised price of a product. The Court held that such fees do not have to be included in the ‘selling price’. It clarified that the selling price must comprise all unavoidable and foreseeable components of the price that constitute the consideration for acquiring the product. However, flat-rate processing costs of this kind are not necessarily payable, since consumers may avoid them by increasing the total value of their order beyond the minimum threshold. As a result, they do not form part of the final price of a unit of the product within the meaning of the directive. The Court further emphasized that including such variable and conditional costs in the selling price could undermine price transparency and hinder consumers’ ability to compare offers effectively. By contrast, indicating those costs separately—provided they are clearly disclosed—better serves the objectives of Directive 98/6, namely ensuring precise, transparent, and unambiguous price information. The Court also noted that an average consumer is capable of combining the product price with any additional fees to determine the total amount payable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that EU law does not require flat-rate processing fees, which depend on the total order value and apply only below a minimum threshold, to be included in the selling price, as long as those fees are clearly indicated and do not become unavoidable in practice.

Heritage or Hype? CJEU Clarifies When Luxury Branding Becomes Misleading

In its judgment of 26 March 2026 (Case C-412/24), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95/EC concerning deceptive trade marks. The case arose from a dispute between luxury leather goods companies regarding the validity of trade marks incorporating the number “1717”, which was perceived by consumers as indicating the historical origin of the brand and suggesting long-standing know-how. The referring court asked whether a trade mark may be considered deceptive where it conveys false information about the age and heritage of the undertaking, leading consumers to infer that the goods possess qualities such as prestige or superior craftsmanship. In particular, the question was whether such misleading indications, although relating formally to the undertaking rather than directly to the product, could nonetheless fall within the prohibition of deceptive marks. The Court held that a trade mark may be refused or declared invalid where it creates actual deception or a sufficiently serious risk of deception regarding the characteristics of the goods. It clarified that, while misleading information about the undertaking itself is not sufficient as such, it may fall within Article 3(1)(g) where it leads consumers to infer incorrect characteristics of the goods, such as quality or prestige. In the luxury sector, those intangible elements—linked to heritage, craftsmanship, and brand image—may constitute essential product characteristics. Accordingly, the Court found that the inclusion in a trade mark of a date perceived as indicating the historical establishment of a business may be deceptive where it falsely suggests long-standing know-how that enhances the perceived quality and prestige of the goods. This is particularly relevant where consumers attach significant importance to heritage in their purchasing decisions. The final assessment remains for the national court, which must determine how the mark is perceived by the relevant public and whether it conveys such misleading associations.

Defective Products Liability in the EU: CJEU Confirms Fault Claims, Clarifies Limitation Periods, and Upholds 10-Year Longstop

In its judgment of 26 March 2026 (Case C-338/24), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products, in a case concerning a claim for damages following vaccination and the impact of a progressive illness on limitation periods. The referring court asked, in particular, whether EU law allows parallel reliance on fault-based liability, how to determine the starting point of the three-year limitation period, and whether the directive’s 10-year longstop is compatible with the right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter. The Court held, first, that Article 13 of the directive does not preclude injured persons from bringing claims under national fault-based liability systems, provided that those claims are based on a different legal basis than the strict liability regime established by the directive. It confirmed that conduct such as maintaining a product on the market despite knowledge of its risks, or failing to comply with duties of vigilance, may constitute independent fault capable of giving rise to liability. As regards limitation periods, the Court clarified that the three-year period under Article 10(1) begins when the claimant becomes aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of the producer. It rejected the interpretation that this period only starts upon stabilization of the damage, holding instead that it is sufficient that the damage has become apparent and can be linked to the product, irrespective of its subsequent evolution. Finally, the Court upheld the validity of the 10-year longstop period laid down in Article 11, finding that it does not infringe the right of access to a court. It emphasized that the provision pursues legitimate objectives of legal certainty and balanced allocation of risk, and that injured persons retain a real opportunity to bring proceedings within the prescribed time limits, including in cases involving progressive harm.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: January and February 2026

Jurisprudência

January and February 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations and further develop core principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in these months, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Air Carriers Must Reimburse Intermediary Commissions as Part of the Ticket Price After Flight Cancellations

On 15 January 2026, the CJEU clarified the scope of Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, read in conjunction with Article 5(1)(a) thereof, concerning the reimbursement of airline ticket prices following flight cancellations where tickets are purchased through intermediaries. The case (C-45/24), referred by the Austrian Supreme Court, arose from proceedings brought by the Austrian consumer association VKI against KLM, seeking reimbursement of an agency commission charged by an online booking platform when passengers purchased tickets that were later cancelled. The Court held that the “price of the ticket” to be reimbursed includes the intermediary’s commission paid by the passenger, even where the air carrier was unaware of the exact amount of that commission. Emphasising that such commissions constitute an unavoidable component of the ticket price in a single transaction authorised by the carrier, the Court rejected an interpretation that would make reimbursement conditional on the carrier’s precise knowledge of the commission. Such an approach, it reasoned, would undermine the high level of passenger protection pursued by Regulation No 261/2004, risk delaying reimbursement, and potentially deter consumers from using intermediaries. The judgment thus reinforces the effectiveness and simplicity of passenger reimbursement rights, while allocating the commercial risk associated with intermediary practices to air carriers rather than consumers.

Rome II Applies to Directors’ Tort Liability for Unlicensed Online Gambling, with Damage Occurring at the Player’s Residence

On 15 January 2026, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Articles 1(2)(d) and 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007) in a case concerning the tort liability of company directors for losses arising from unlicensed online gambling activities. The case (C-77/24, Wunner (i)), referred by the Austrian Supreme Court, arose from an action brought by an Austrian consumer seeking recovery of gambling losses from the directors of a Maltese online gambling company that operated in Austria without the licence required under national law. The Court held, first, that such an action does not fall within the exclusion for “non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies” under Article 1(2)(d) Rome II, since the alleged liability is based on the infringement of a general statutory prohibition, external to the internal organisation or management of the company. Second, the Court ruled that, for the purposes of Article 4(1) Rome II, the place where the damage occurred is the Member State in which the player is habitually resident, as this is where the protected interest is harmed and where participation in the unlawful online gambling activity takes place. By anchoring both the applicable law and the localisation of damage to the player’s residence, the judgment enhances legal certainty and predictability, while strengthening consumer protection against cross-border illegal gambling practices and facilitating effective private enforcement against company directors.

Banks May Raise a Plea of Set-off Following the Invalidation of a Consumer Credit Agreement Containing Unfair Terms

On 22 January 2026, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in RM and EM v Santander Bank Polska S.A. (Case C-902/24), clarifying the interpretation of Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, read in light of the principle of effectiveness, in the context of restitution following the invalidation of a consumer credit agreement due to unfair terms. The reference for a preliminary ruling was made by a Polish court in proceedings brought by two consumers seeking repayment of amounts paid under a mortgage loan agreement declared void as a result of unfair terms. In response to the consumers’ restitution claim, the bank raised, in the alternative, a plea of set-off corresponding to the loan principal. The Court recalled that, where an unfair term renders a contract incapable of continuing in existence, EU law does not itself determine the legal consequences of that invalidity, which remain governed by national law, subject to compliance with EU consumer protection requirements. It held that Directive 93/13/EEC does not preclude national legislation allowing a seller or supplier to raise, in the alternative, a plea of set-off against the consumer’s restitution claim, provided that such a claim is not treated as due before the contract has been definitively invalidated and does not undermine the effectiveness of the protection conferred on consumers. The Court further emphasised that national rules on procedural costs must not have a dissuasive effect on consumers seeking to exercise their rights under the directive. The judgment thus confirms that national restitution and set-off mechanisms may be compatible with EU consumer law, while reaffirming that their application must not weaken the deterrent effect of the unfair terms regime or discourage consumers from seeking judicial protection. The decision has been commented on, inter alia, Courthouse News and NOVA Consumer Lab, highlighting both its practical implications for mortgage litigation and the open questions it leaves from a consumer law perspective.

Pre-Action Disclosure in Competition Damages Claims Must Respect the Plausibility Threshold, Even in Consumer Collective Actions

On 29 January 2026, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU in a case concerning access to evidence prior to the bringing of a competition damages action on behalf of consumers. The case (C-286/24), referred for a preliminary ruling by the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Supreme Court, Portugal), arose from a dispute between Meliá Hotels International and Associação Ius Omnibus regarding a request for disclosure of documents intended to support a potential collective action for damages following a Commission decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. The consumer association sought access to evidence in order to assess the harm allegedly suffered by Portuguese consumers as a result of territorial restrictions in hotel booking conditions. The Court held that Article 5(1) applies to actions brought specifically for the purpose of obtaining disclosure before a damages claim is formally introduced, provided that national law allows such procedural mechanisms. However, the CJEU clarified that a Commission decision establishing a vertical restriction by object does not, in itself, suffice to demonstrate the plausibility of harm for the purposes of ordering disclosure. Unlike cartels, vertical infringements do not benefit from the presumption of harm under Article 17(2) of the Directive, and claimants — including consumer representative bodies — must present reasonably available evidence capable of supporting the plausibility of damage and a causal link. The Court further emphasised that the plausibility requirement does not amount to a full evidentiary standard, but it must prevent speculative or purely exploratory requests. The judgment thus strengthens procedural tools available for consumer collective redress in competition matters, while safeguarding proportionality and legal certainty in the disclosure of evidence.

No General Presumption of Confidentiality for Member States’ Votes in Comitology Procedures

On 5 February 2026, the CJEU clarified the scope of public access to documents in the context of comitology procedures, in a case concerning the disclosure of Member States’ individual votes cast within a committee assisting the Commission in the adoption of an implementing regulation of general application. The case (C-540/23 P), referred to the Court of Justice on appeal by the European Commission against Covington & Burling LLP and Mr Bart Van Vooren, arose from a request for access to documents revealing how Member States voted within the PAFF Committee during the preparation of a draft regulation amending Annex III to Regulation No 1925/2006 on substances added to food. The Commission argued that disclosure of those individual votes would seriously undermine its decision-making process and that the comitology framework reflected structural confidentiality protecting national positions. The Court held that, although such votes constitute opinions expressed as part of internal deliberations, the regulatory framework governing comitology does not establish a general presumption of non-disclosure. It confirmed that institutions must carry out a specific and concrete assessment of the actual risk associated with disclosure and cannot rely on abstract reasoning concerning the need to preserve cooperation between Member States. The CJEU further emphasised that increased openness enhances democratic legitimacy and accountability, particularly where implementing measures may affect consumers and EU citizens as a whole. The judgment thus reaffirms that comitology procedures are subject to the EU’s constitutional commitment to transparency and that exceptions to access to documents must be interpreted strictly.

Member States May Prohibit GMO (genetically modified organism) Cultivation Without Specific Justification Under Transitional Mechanism

On 5 February 2026, the CJEU ruled on the validity of Article 26c(1) and (3) of Directive 2001/18, as amended by Directive 2015/412, in joined preliminary ruling proceedings concerning national prohibitions on the cultivation of MON 810 genetically modified maize. The cases (C-364/24 and C-393/24), referred by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy) and the Tribunale di Udine (District Court, Udine, Italy), arose from disputes brought by Mr Giorgio Fidenato following orders to destroy GMO maize crops and the imposition of administrative fines for breaching the Italian prohibition implemented pursuant to Commission Implementing Decision 2016/321. The referring courts questioned whether allowing Member States, during the transitional period, to demand an adjustment of the geographical scope of an existing GMO authorisation without providing specific justification was compatible with the free movement of goods, proportionality, non-discrimination, freedom to conduct a business, and WTO obligations. The Court held that the mechanism established in Article 26c(1) and (3) is valid, emphasising that cultivation prohibitions adopted under that procedure require the tacit consent of the authorisation holder and do not affect the free circulation of authorised GMO products as goods. It further clarified that such measures do not undermine consumers’ freedom of choice, since authorised GMO products may continue to be marketed and consumed within the internal market. The CJEU confirmed that the EU legislature acted within its broad discretion under Article 114 TFEU, balancing internal market objectives with subsidiarity and national flexibility regarding land use. The Court also ruled that decisions adopted under Article 26c(1) and (3) need not rely on the specific grounds listed in Article 26b(3), and that Implementing Decision 2016/321 does not preclude national penalties that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

Compliance of a Mortgage Loan Interest Clause Based on a Regulated Benchmark Does Not in Itself Render the Term Unfair

On 12 February 2026, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Articles 1(2), 4(2) and 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, read in conjunction with Regulation 2016/1011, in a case concerning the fairness and transparency of a variable interest rate clause in a mortgage loan agreement concluded with a consumer. The case (C-471/24), referred by a Polish court, arose from proceedings between a consumer and a bank regarding a loan indexed to the WIBOR 6M benchmark, where the consumer argued that the clause was unfair due to the methodology of that index and the bank’s role as a contributing entity. The Court held, first, that Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 does not exclude such a term from review where national law merely lays down a general framework for determining interest rates while leaving the professional free to choose the benchmark and margin. Secondly, the CJEU ruled that the transparency requirement under Article 4(2) does not oblige the creditor to provide detailed information on the methodology of the benchmark, provided that it has complied with the information duties laid down in Directive 2014/17 and has not given the consumer a distorted picture of the index. Thirdly, the Court found that the fact that the benchmark methodology may rely on input data not strictly corresponding to actual transactions, and that the creditor is one of the contributing banks, does not in itself create a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer, where the index complied with Regulation 2016/1011 at the time of contract conclusion. The judgment thus confirms that the mere use of a regulated benchmark in a mortgage loan agreement does not automatically render the interest clause unfair, while preserving the consumer’s right to judicial review of the term as a whole under Directive 93/13.

Política de «no show» das companhias aéreas: uma mudança de paradigma

Jurisprudência

Por João Carminho

No início de 2023, deparei-me com uma situação que me pareceu, imediatamente, injusta: a política de “no show”, adotada por algumas companhias aéreas, traduzida no cancelamento automático de viagens de volta quando os consumidores não compareçam nas respetivas viagens de ida e/ou na cobrança de penalidades pelo não comparecimento nessas viagens de ida.

No caso concreto, a companhia aérea era a Sata Internacional – Azores Airlines, S.A. (“Sata”) e estava em causa uma viagem Lisboa-Ponta Delgada-Lisboa.

Após alguma pesquisa, concluí que esta prática já tinha sido declarada ilegal em vários países, inclusive da União Europeia, por contender com diversas normas de direito do consumo equivalentes às vigentes em Portugal.

E a razão é simples: a obrigação dos consumidores neste tipo de contrato (de prestação de serviços de transporte aéreo) não é – nem pode ser – a “apresentação no voo de ida” (nem – acrescente-se, no voo de volta), mas sim, e tão só, o pagamento do preço por cada um desses voos, sem prejuízo de outras obrigações acessórias (por exemplo, a realização do check-in), impostas por razões de segurança.

As companhias aéreas – essas sim – obrigam-se a transportar os consumidores na viagem de ida e na viagem de volta, independentemente de os mesmos não comparecerem na primeira e comparecerem na segunda (ou vice-versa), o que (algumas delas) se recusam a fazer, com o impacto – financeiro e logístico – causado na vida dos consumidores.

Com esta prática, as companhias “baralham”, assim, as obrigações contratuais de cada uma das partes – e fazem-no em seu próprio benefício, já que assim podem voltar a vender as viagens automaticamente canceladas ao preço de mercado nesse momento (geralmente superior ao preço inicial, por ser mais próximo da data da viagem), obtendo, por essa via, um duplo – e injustificado – enriquecimento (que pode ser ainda maior em casos de overbooking).

Confrontado com esta realidade, decidi, a título pessoal e em auto-representação, propor uma ação popular inibitória contra a Sata, tendo em vista a declaração de nulidade da política de “no show” e a sua proibição de aplicação futura por parte daquela companhia aérea.

Na tentativa de justificar a legalidade desta prática, a Sata procurou enquadrá-la nas suas políticas internas, nas suas tarifas (complexas, de difícil leitura e sujeitas a alterações ao longo do tempo) e num conceito muito particular de “viagem sequencial”.

Segundo esta tese, quando um consumidor compra uma viagem de ida e volta, está a adquirir uma única viagem.

No entanto, não é isso que resulta do processo de compra deste tipo de viagens (em que o consumidor começa por escolher a viagem de ida, por um preço, e a viagem de volta, por outro preço), nem da realidade fáctica / empírica da situação. É que o consumidor, ao adquirir este tipo de viagens, está a reservar dois voos distintos, em circunstâncias de tempo e espaço diferentes, com duas passagens / cartões de embarque distintos e tem de fazer dois check-ins. Trata-se, portanto, de duas viagens distintas e independentes, com um preço autonomizável, podendo uma existir sem a outra.

E se assim é, e se os consumidores pagam por cada um desses voos, as companhias aéreas não têm outra obrigação senão a de os transportar, independentemente de aqueles comparecerem num voo e noutro não, bem como da tarifa escolhida.

Neste sentido, o Tribunal Judicial da Comarca dos Açores (Juízo Local Cível de Ponta Delgada), proferiu, em julho de 2025, sentença a declarar, em suma, esta prática “nula e proibida, quer por violação do n.º 1 [direito à proteção dos interesses económicos dos consumidores], alínea b) do n.º 2 [obrigação de não inclusão de cláusulas que originem um significativo desequilíbrio em detrimento do consumidor] e n.º 6 do artigo 9.º [proibição de fazer depender o fornecimento de um serviço da aquisição ou da prestação de outro ou outros] da Lei de Defesa do Consumidor e da al. b) do art. 22.º da LCCG [proibição de cláusulas que permitam a quem as predisponha resolver o contrato sem motivo justificativo], quer porque contende com o princípio da boa-fé (cfr. arts. 15.º e 16.º, deste último diploma legal)”.

Já quanto aos argumentos avançados pela Sata, de cariz essencialmente económico (possibilidade de estabelecer tarifas mais flexíveis e reduzidas, necessidade de adequação ao mercado altamente concorrencial, gestão dinâmica dos preços, fomento da concorrência entre transportadoras aéreas, melhoria da conectividade e redução do desperdício da capacidade das aeronaves), entendeu o Tribunal que “tais fatores não legitimam a prática abusiva das cláusulas de «no show», impostas pela ré sem qualquer tratamento diferenciado, correspondendo ao recebimento de uma prestação (preço) sem a correspondente contraprestação”.

Esta decisão transitou em julgado em setembro de 2025 e assume particular relevância num contexto em que a política de “no show” continua a ser aplicada em Portugal por outras companhias aéreas.

Mais do que resolver um litígio concreto, esta decisão contribui para clarificar o enquadramento jurídico dos direitos dos passageiros aéreos e evidencia o papel das ações populares enquanto instrumento de tutela coletiva dos consumidores no ordenamento jurídico português.

Herchoski (C-902/24): key holdings and open questions from a consumer law perspective

Jurisprudência

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 22 January 2026 in Herchoski (C-902/24) addresses a set of recurring and sensitive issues concerning the consequences of the nullity of consumer credit agreements containing unfair terms, in particular mortgage loans indexed to foreign currencies. Beyond the specific point of short deadlines for restitution, the judgment clarifies some aspects of EU consumer law, while leaving others only partially resolved.

1. Set-off between restitution claims following the nullity of the contract

The Court confirms that EU law does not, in principle, preclude national rules allowing the set-off of reciprocal restitution claims arising from the nullity of a consumer credit agreement (paras 59–66, 85). In particular, it distinguishes set-off from mechanisms such as a right of retention previously found incompatible with Directive 93/13, stressing that set-off, as understood under Polish law, produces effects equivalent to reciprocal payments and does not, as such, deprive the consumer of default interest (paras 63–66).

At the same time, the Court recalls that the bank may not obtain any remuneration for the use of the capital beyond reimbursement of the principal and statutory default interest, in line with its earlier case-law (para. 73).

2. Set-off invoked in the alternative by the seller or supplier

The Court accepts that a bank may raise a plea of set-off in the alternative, while maintaining as its principal argument that the contract is valid (paras 70–72, 85). This conclusion is grounded in both the right to effective judicial protection and the principle of equality of arms, which also apply to sellers or suppliers in consumer disputes.

However, the Court draws a crucial limit: as long as the bank continues to argue that the contract is valid, its restitution claim cannot be regarded as due. Any formal notice served on the consumer before the judicial declaration of nullity must therefore be considered ineffective, in particular for the purposes of default interest (para. 74).

3. Short deadlines for restitution of the loan capital

The issue of short deadlines imposed on consumers for the restitution of the loan capital is the point at which the judgment is at its most cautious, and, arguably, most problematic. The Court acknowledges that the duration of the payment period is governed by national law, but insists that, in light of all the circumstances, it must not be such as to deter or prevent consumers from exercising the rights conferred by Directive 93/13 (para. 75).

However, the Court refrains from articulating any substantive criteria for assessing when a deadline becomes dissuasive. It does not indicate whether a period such as the 14-day deadline at issue in the main proceedings is, in itself, incompatible with EU law, nor does it expressly engage with the economic reality of mortgage credit. In most cases, the loan capital has been irreversibly used to acquire the property, making its immediate restitution not merely difficult, but potentially impossible. The risk faced by consumers is therefore not limited to procedural inconvenience, but extends to default, insolvency, or loss of the home.

Rather than confronting this structural constraint directly, the Court links the assessment of the deadline to the duty of the national court to inform the consumer, in an objective and comprehensive manner, of the legal consequences of nullity before it takes effect (paras 67 and 75). This approach places considerable weight on information and individual choice, assuming that a fully informed consumer can meaningfully decide whether to invoke nullity.

From a consumer law perspective, this assumption is open to serious doubt. Even perfect information does not neutralise structural economic asymmetry. Where the consumer lacks any realistic capacity to repay the capital within a short time frame, the choice between invoking nullity and maintaining a contract containing unfair terms may be largely illusory. By treating the problem primarily as one of information rather than of economic feasibility, the Court effectively shifts the burden of managing this tension onto national courts, without providing clear guidance on how to resolve it.

4. Centrality of the informed intention of the consumer

The judgment reiterates that the protection afforded by Directive 93/13 ultimately depends on the consumer’s intention. If, after being duly informed by the national court of the consequences of removing the unfair terms, the consumer does not oppose the declaration of nullity, the resulting restitution mechanisms, including set-off, are not contrary to EU law (paras 67–69).

This emphasis reinforces the role of information and consent, but also raises questions as to the extent to which consumer choice can be regarded as genuinely free in situations of structural economic constraint.

5. Allocation of costs and the principle of effectiveness

As regards costs, the Court recalls that this matter falls within the procedural autonomy of the Member States, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (paras 76–77). While consumers may, in principle, bear some costs, national rules must not deter them from exercising their rights under Directive 93/13 (paras 78–79).

Importantly, the Court stresses the obligation of national courts to interpret domestic procedural rules in conformity with EU law, making use, where necessary, of corrective mechanisms that allow for a more equitable allocation of costs (paras 80–83). At the same time, it leaves room for courts to take into account possible bad faith on the part of consumers who challenge a set-off without justification (para. 84).

6. Overall assessment

The Herchoski judgment does not signal a reversal of the Court’s consumer-protective case-law, but rather a phase of consolidation and restraint. The Court confirms that set-off mechanisms and procedural defences available under national law are not, in themselves, incompatible with Directive 93/13, while insisting on safeguards relating to the timing of restitution claims, the absence of remuneration for capital, and the need to avoid dissuasive effects.

At the same time, several crucial issues, most notably the practical impact of short restitution deadlines and the limits of consumer autonomy in contexts of economic constraint, are left unresolved and largely entrusted to national courts. The effectiveness of consumer protection in this area will therefore continue to depend, to a significant extent, on how those courts operationalise the principles laid down by the Court of Justice.

7. Policy implications

From a policy perspective, the Herchoski judgment highlights the growing tension between traditional restitutionary logic and the objectives of EU consumer protection in long-term credit relationships. If the effectiveness of the rights conferred by Directive 93/13 is to be preserved, legislators and courts alike may need to reflect on whether immediate restitution of the loan capital, following the nullity of a mortgage credit agreement, should remain the default solution. Possible avenues include statutory or judicially recognised mechanisms for the deferment or staged repayment of the capital, clearer rules on the moment at which restitution claims become enforceable, and a more explicit integration of consumers’ economic capacity into the assessment of dissuasive effects. Without such adjustments, there is a risk that the formal availability of consumer rights will coexist with practical barriers that prevent their meaningful exercise. The Herchoski judgment thus invites a broader reflection on how EU consumer law can reconcile legal coherence with economic reality in the context of housing finance.