Jurisprudência

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: April 2026

Jurisprudência

April 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in this month, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Consumer Acknowledgment Can Interrupt Limitation Periods: CJEU Clarifies Effects in Unfair Contract Cases

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-901/24, Falucka), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC in the context of restitution claims following the invalidity of consumer contracts containing unfair terms. The case concerned proceedings between mBank and several consumers after a mortgage loan agreement was declared void due to unfair terms, raising the question whether a consumer’s acknowledgment of debt, made during litigation, can interrupt the limitation period for the bank’s restitution claim.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude national rules under which such an acknowledgment interrupts the limitation period. It reasoned that this does not undermine the effectiveness of consumer protection, since the invalidity of unfair terms must restore the parties to their original position, which may include mutual restitution. The Court emphasized that the consumer’s right to restitution remains intact, and that allowing interruption of limitation periods does not make it excessively difficult to exercise rights under EU law.

Importantly, the Court clarified that a consumer’s informed acknowledgment, made after being advised of the legal consequences of contract invalidation, may validly produce legal effects, including restarting limitation periods. It rejected the argument that such acknowledgments inherently disadvantage consumers, noting that consumers must be properly informed, but not exhaustively instructed on all procedural consequences, such as limitation rules.

The Court also found that this approach is consistent with the principles of legal certainty and the right of access to a court, as it allows sellers or suppliers to rely on consumer statements when deciding whether to initiate legal action. Such rules ensure predictability and fairness in legal relations, without compromising the protective purpose of Directive 93/13.

Overall, the judgment confirms that consumer protection under EU law does not exclude procedural consequences flowing from a consumer’s own informed statements, and that national limitation rules, when applied proportionately, remain compatible with the Directive’s objectives.

Online Gambling Restrictions and Restitution of Losses: CJEU Confirms Compatibility with EU Law

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-440/23, FB), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 56 TFEU in the context of national restrictions on online gambling and claims for restitution of losses incurred under unlawful gambling contracts. The case concerned proceedings between a consumer and Malta-based online gambling operators, raising questions about whether German legislation prohibiting certain online games of chance, such as slot machines and secondary lotteries, was compatible with the freedom to provide services.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude national legislation imposing a general prohibition on specific forms of online gambling, even where other types of gambling are permitted, including land-based games and certain licensed online activities like sports betting. It reasoned that Member States retain broad discretion in regulating gambling to protect consumers and prevent fraud and addiction, and that differences in regulatory treatment between types of games do not, in themselves, undermine the consistency or proportionality of such legislation.

The Court emphasized that the existence of demand for prohibited online gambling services, or the fact that similar services are lawfully offered in other Member States, does not invalidate national restrictions. It also clarified that a later legislative shift towards a licensing system does not retroactively affect the legality or consequences of a prior prohibition, including during transitional regulatory periods.

Importantly, the Court confirmed that contracts concluded in breach of such national prohibitions may be considered void under applicable national law, and that consumers may seek restitution of losses incurred. It rejected the argument that such claims constitute an abuse of rights, noting that restitution arises from national contract law and reflects the consequences of illegality, rather than reliance on EU law itself.

Overall, the judgment reaffirms the wide regulatory autonomy of Member States in the gambling sector and confirms that national rules on contract nullity and restitution, when applied consistently with EU law, do not infringe the freedom to provide services.

Bank Restitution Actions May Interrupt Limitation Periods Despite Parallel Invalidity Proceedings: CJEU Clarifies Consumer Protection Limits

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-752/24, Jangielak), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, together with the principles of effectiveness, proportionality, legal certainty and the right of access to a court, in the context of restitution claims following the invalidity of consumer credit agreements containing unfair terms. The case concerned proceedings between mBank and consumers after a mortgage loan agreement indexed to the Swiss franc was challenged for containing unfair terms, raising the question whether a bank’s action for restitution, brought before the final outcome of separate invalidity proceedings initiated by consumers, can interrupt the limitation period.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude national rules under which the bringing of such a restitution action interrupts the limitation period, even where parallel proceedings on the invalidity of the contract are still ongoing. It reasoned that this mechanism is compatible with the objective of Directive 93/13, since the invalidity of unfair terms requires restoring the parties to their original position, which may include mutual restitution obligations.

The Court emphasized that consumer protection does not exclude the bank’s right to seek restitution, as denying such a possibility could infringe the principle of proportionality and lead to unjust enrichment of the consumer. It also stressed that allowing interruption of limitation periods ensures effective judicial protection and access to a court for the seller or supplier, maintaining a fair balance between the parties.

Importantly, the Court clarified that the mere obligation for consumers to defend themselves in restitution proceedings does not make the exercise of their rights excessively difficult, provided that national courts ensure procedural safeguards. In particular, courts must verify that costs are not disproportionately high and may, where appropriate, stay proceedings to avoid undermining consumer protection.

The Court further found that such rules are consistent with the principle of legal certainty, as they ensure predictability in legal relations by allowing limitation periods to be interrupted through judicial actions in a uniform manner.

Overall, the judgment confirms that Directive 93/13 does not prevent national procedural rules that allow banks to interrupt limitation periods through restitution actions, even during ongoing invalidity proceedings, provided that consumer rights are not rendered excessively difficult or impossible to exercise.

Equity May Justify Allowing Time-Barred Bank Claims: CJEU Sets Limits Under Consumer Law

In its judgment of 16 April 2026 (Case C-753/24, Rzepacz), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC does not preclude national rules allowing courts, in exceptional circumstances, to grant a bank’s restitution claim even after the limitation period has expired, where equity so requires.

The Court emphasized that the invalidity of unfair terms entails restoring the parties to their original position, including mutual restitution, and that fully excluding the bank’s claim could breach the principle of proportionalityand lead to unjust enrichment.

However, such exceptions must remain strictly limited, based on objective criteria, and applied so that they do not make it excessively difficult for consumers to exercise their rights, particularly by avoiding disproportionate costs.

Overall, the ruling confirms that equity-based exceptions to limitation periods are permissible, provided they do not undermine effective consumer protection under EU law.

Non-Publication of ISO Standards Does Not Preclude Their Enforceability Where Access Is Ensured: CJEU Clarifies Rule of Law Requirements

In its judgment of 21 April 2026 (Case C-155/24, Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40/EU in light of the principle of the rule of law, legal certainty, and free access to EU law, in the context of measuring tobacco emissions. The case concerned whether ISO standards referenced in EU legislation, but not published in the Official Journal, can be enforced against individuals.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude the enforceability of such ISO standards where individuals have had actual access to their official and authentic content, even if they were not formally published. In such cases, individuals cannot rely on alternative measurement methods to challenge compliance with emission limits.

The Court emphasized that free and effective access to legal rules is a core requirement of the rule of law under Article 2 TEU. Therefore, standards incorporated into EU law must be accessible in a general, non-discriminatory, and free-of-charge manner, ensuring that individuals can verify compliance and enforce their rights.

Importantly, the Court clarified that once such access is guaranteed, the absence of formal publication in the Official Journal does not undermine the binding nature of those standards. At the same time, it stressed that the EU must ensure access to these standards, even where they are protected by intellectual property rights, due to an overriding public interest.

Overall, the judgment confirms that non-publication of technical standards does not prevent their application, provided that effective access is ensured, thereby safeguarding both legal certainty and a high level of public health protection under EU law.

Charging Interest on Credit Costs Is Precluded Under EU Law: CJEU Clarifies Scope of “Total Amount of Credit”

In its judgment of 23 April 2026 (Case C-744/24, P.W. v Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A.), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 3(g) and (j) and Article 10(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC in the context of consumer credit agreements involving financed insurance premiums. The case concerned whether a lender may apply interest not only to the amount actually disbursed to the consumer, but also to costs associated with the credit, such as insurance premiums.

The Court held that EU law precludes such a practice. Interest, defined as the “borrowing rate”, may be applied only to the amount of credit actually made available to the consumer, and not to sums forming part of the total cost of the credit, even where those costs are financed as part of the agreement.

The Court emphasized the strict distinction established by Directive 2008/48 between the “total amount of credit” and the “total cost of the credit to the consumer”. Costs such as insurance premiums, particularly where they are required to obtain the credit on advertised terms, fall within the latter category and cannot be treated as part of the credit drawn down.

Importantly, the Court clarified that this prohibition applies regardless of whether the relevant sums are physically transferred to the consumer or paid directly to third parties. The classification of such amounts depends on their economic function within the credit agreement, not on the method of disbursement.

Overall, the judgment confirms that lenders cannot circumvent EU consumer protection rules by artificially inflating the base on which interest is calculated. By excluding credit costs from the interest-bearing amount, the ruling reinforces transparency, ensures comparability of credit offers, and safeguards a high level of consumer protection under EU law.

Consumers May Enforce Rights Against Transferee Banks: CJEU Confirms Limits Under Directive 93/13

In its judgment of 23 April 2026 (Case C-761/24, HM and JD v AXA Bank Belgium SA and Others), the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified the application of Directive 93/13/EEC to loan agreements transferred between credit institutions.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude requiring consumers to assert their rights only against the transferee of a contract, as long as this does not make those rights impossible or excessively difficult to exercise.

It stressed that the concept of “seller or supplier” includes transferee banks, and that all legal consequences of unfair terms must remain enforceable against them under the same conditions as against the original lender.

Overall, the judgment confirms that contract transfers cannot undermine consumer protection, and rights must remain fully effective after the transfer.

Nota crítica ao acórdão Staubsaugerservice (C‑62/25)

Jurisprudência

No acórdão Staubsaugerservice (C-62/25), de 26 de março, o Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia (TJUE) debruça-se sobre uma questão central do direito do consumo: o que deve estar incluído no preço apresentado ao consumidor?

O caso dizia respeito à venda online de sacos para aspirador. O produto era anunciado por € 14,90, com referências a “entrega gratuita” e “portes grátis”. Ao lado do preço, surgia um asterisco, que remetia para outra página, onde se explicava que poderiam ser cobradas “despesas de processamento” se o valor total da encomenda não atingisse um determinado valor. Quando o consumidor colocava o bem no carrinho, aparecia então um acréscimo de € 3,95, identificado como “sobretaxa por pequena quantidade”.

A questão submetida ao TJUE era a de saber se estas despesas de processamento deveriam ser incluídas no “preço de venda”, na aceção do art. 2.º-a) da Diretiva 98/6/CE, relativa à indicação dos preços dos produtos oferecidos aos consumidores.

A resposta do Tribunal é negativa. Segundo o TJUE, esses custos não têm de ser incluídos no preço de venda se variarem em função do valor global da encomenda e só forem devidos abaixo de um montante mínimo, desde que sejam claramente indicados e que esse limiar não torne, na prática, o seu pagamento inevitável.

A decisão não convence.

O primeiro problema está na própria qualificação destas chamadas “despesas de processamento”. O que são exatamente? Não parecem corresponder a despesas de transporte, entrega ou expedição, até porque o próprio site anunciava a gratuitidade da entrega e dos portes. Também não parecem corresponder a um serviço acessório autónomo pedido pelo consumidor. Na realidade, funcionam como uma parcela do montante exigido pelo profissional quando o consumidor compra apenas aquele bem ou compra abaixo de certo valor. Nesse sentido, tudo indica que deveriam ser tratadas como parte do preço.

Dito de outro modo: se o profissional pretende incentivar compras de valor mais elevado, pode fazê-lo através de um desconto ou de uma vantagem para encomendas acima de determinado limiar. O que não deveria poder fazer é o inverso: anunciar um preço mais baixo e acrescentar depois um valor adicional se o consumidor não atingir esse limiar. Essa construção é artificial e contrária à lógica da transparência. O que surge apresentado como “despesa de processamento” parece ser, em substância, a forma invertida de uma política de desconto.

O segundo problema está no raciocínio do Tribunal quanto ao caráter “evitável” destes custos. O TJUE entende que não são obrigatoriamente suportados pelo consumidor porque este os pode evitar se comprar mais produtos e atingir um valor mínimo de encomenda. O ponto relevante consiste, no entanto, em saber se, para comprar aquele bem nas condições em que ele lhe é apresentado, esse montante é ou não inevitável.

Se o consumidor quiser comprar apenas um pacote de sacos para aspirador anunciado por € 14,90 e tiver de pagar mais € 3,95, então esse valor é, na prática, parte do custo de aquisição daquele bem. A circunstância de o consumidor poder evitá-lo comprando mais não elimina essa realidade. Apenas revela a função económica do mecanismo: aumentar o valor médio das encomendas.

O terceiro ponto, talvez o mais importante, diz respeito à transparência. A Diretiva 98/6/CE tem um objetivo muito claro: melhorar a informação dos consumidores e facilitar a comparação dos preços. O art. 4.º-1 exige que o preço de venda seja inequívoco, facilmente identificável e perfeitamente legível. Ora, tal não parece verificar-se neste caso.

O consumidor não vê logo o preço total a pagar. Vê um preço e um asterisco e, eventualmente, uma remissão para outra página. Para perceber quanto terá efetivamente de pagar, tem de detetar esse sinal, abrir a página, interpretar as condições relativas ao valor da encomenda e fazer o cálculo. Isto não é transparência. É fragmentação da informação sobre o preço.

É, aliás, difícil aceitar a ideia de que esta apresentação favorece a comparabilidade dos preços. Pelo contrário: se uma loja anuncia o produto por € 14,90 e outra por € 15,90, a primeira parece mais vantajosa. Mas se, na primeira, acrescem € 3,95, a conclusão inverte-se. A comparação é falseada precisamente porque o preço apresentado ao consumidor não corresponde ao montante que este terá de pagar na compra em causa.

Em suma, o acórdão Staubsaugerservice adota uma perspetiva excessivamente formal sobre o conceito de preço de venda e enfraquece as exigências de transparência na comunicação do preço ao consumidor.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: March 2026

Jurisprudência

March 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations and further develop core principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in this month, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Consumer Assistance Does Not Preclude Distance Contract Status, but Withdrawal May Be Abusive

In its judgment of 5 March 2026 (Case C-564/24), the Court of Justice interpreted key provisions of Directive 2011/83/EU concerning the notion of a distance contract and the right of withdrawal. The case concerned a dispute between Eisenberger Gerüstbau GmbH and a consumer (JK), who, after concluding a contract for scaffolding works through an architect acting on her behalf, sought to withdraw from that contract and recover payments already made. The referring German court asked whether the involvement of a trader assisting the consumer affected the classification of the contract and the applicability of consumer protection rules. The Court held that the fact that a consumer is assisted by another trader — even where that trader initiates contact with the service provider and influences key contractual terms — is not relevant for determining whether the contract qualifies as a “distance contract” within the meaning of Article 2(7). Nor does such assistance affect the consumer’s status, which must be assessed objectively by reference to the purpose of the contract. The Court further clarified that an addendum concluded exclusively through means of distance communication may itself constitute a distance contract, even if the main contract does not, provided the conditions laid down in the directive are met. Finally, the Court ruled that, although consumers benefit from a broad right of withdrawal, its exercise may, in exceptional circumstances, be considered abusive. This may be the case where the consumer withdraws at the end of an extended withdrawal period after the services have already been fully performed, with the intention of avoiding payment. However, such abuse must be established by the national court on the basis of all the circumstances, including both objective and subjective elements. This decision is discussed here.

Reduced VAT for Accommodation May Exclude Ancillary Services Without Breaching EU Law

In its judgment of 5 March 2026 (Joined Cases C-409/24 to C-411/24), the Court of Justice interpreted Article 98 of Directive 2006/112/EC concerning reduced VAT rates and their application to accommodation services supplied to consumers. The cases concerned disputes between German hotel operators and tax authorities, where services such as breakfast, parking, Wi-Fi, and wellness access were provided together with short-term accommodation and paid for by consumers under a single price. The referring court asked whether EU law precludes national rules requiring those services to be separated and taxed at the standard rate, even where they are ancillary to the principal accommodation supply. The Court held that EU law does not preclude such national legislation. It confirmed that, although ancillary services may form part of a single economic supply from the perspective of consumers, Member States may apply reduced VAT rates selectively to specific aspects of the categories listed in Annex III. Accordingly, accommodation services supplied to consumers may be distinguished from other services provided alongside them, provided that this distinction is based on objective criteria. The Court also clarified that the classification of a transaction as a single supply is not decisive where such discretion is exercised. Finally, the Court emphasized that the principle of fiscal neutrality must be respected. This requires that similar services from the perspective of consumers — such as breakfast or parking offered independently — are not treated differently for VAT purposes. Therefore, excluding ancillary services from the reduced rate is permissible, provided that they are subject to the same standard rate whether supplied independently or together with accommodation. The final assessment remains for the national court.

Virtual Game Currency Is Not VAT-Exempt and Must Be Fully Taxed, with No Special Treatment for Consumers

In its judgment of 5 March 2026 (Case C-472/24), the Court of Justice interpreted provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC concerning VAT exemptions for currency transactions and the concept of vouchers. The case concerned a dispute between MB “Žaidimų valiuta” and the Lithuanian tax authority regarding the VAT treatment of transactions involving the purchase and resale of virtual currency (“Gold”) used in the online game Runescape, including implications for consumers engaging in such exchanges. The referring body asked whether those transactions could be exempt as currency operations or treated as multi-purpose vouchers, and how the taxable amount should be calculated. The Court held that virtual game currency such as “Gold” does not fall within the VAT exemption for currency transactions under Article 135(1)(e), since it is not accepted as an alternative means of payment outside the game and does not function as a genuine currency for consumers in the wider economy. It further clarified that such virtual units cannot be classified as vouchers within the meaning of Article 30a, because they do not entitle consumers to receive distinct goods or services but instead constitute the very digital service consumed within the game. Consequently, the transactions must be treated as taxable supplies of electronic services. Finally, the Court ruled that VAT must be calculated on the full amount received for the sale of the virtual currency, rather than only on the trader’s margin, meaning that no preferential calculation method applies even where consumers are involved in the transaction chain.

Limitation Periods and Consumer Awareness: CJEU Strengthens Protection Against Unfair Terms in Foreign Currency Loans

In its judgment of 19 March 2026 (Case C-679/24), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Articles 1 and 7 of Directive 93/13/EEC concerning the effectiveness of consumer protection in relation to limitation periods for claims based on unfair terms. The case arose from a dispute in Hungary between a consumer and financial institutions regarding a foreign-currency loan agreement containing a clause placing exchange rate risk entirely on the consumer. The referring court asked whether EU law precludes national rules under which a consumer’s claim for the legal consequences of the invalidity of such an agreement is subject to a five-year limitation period running from the date of conclusion of the contract, and whether judicial decisions could affect the starting point or suspension of that period. The Court held that EU law precludes a judicial interpretation of national law under which such a limitation period begins to run from the date the contract was concluded, where the consumer was not aware and could not reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of the term at that time. It emphasized that such a rule risks making the exercise of consumer rights excessively difficult, contrary to the principle of effectiveness. The Court further clarified that the date of judgments of the Court of Justice or national supreme courts cannot be used to determine the starting point or resumption of the limitation period, since consumers cannot be expected to monitor or interpret case-law developments in order to assert their rights. Only a final judicial decision concerning the specific consumer, duly notified, may establish awareness sufficient to trigger the limitation period. The final assessment of whether the consumer could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness remains for the national court.

“Final Price”… but with Conditions: CJEU Clarifies When Extra Fees Stay Outside the Listed Price

In its judgment of 26 March 2026 (Case C-62/25), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 2(a) of Directive 98/6/EC concerning the concept of ‘selling price’ in the context of online sales. The case arose from a dispute in Germany between a consumer protection association and an online retailer regarding whether flat-rate processing fees, charged only when the total order value falls below a certain threshold, must be included in the advertised price of a product. The Court held that such fees do not have to be included in the ‘selling price’. It clarified that the selling price must comprise all unavoidable and foreseeable components of the price that constitute the consideration for acquiring the product. However, flat-rate processing costs of this kind are not necessarily payable, since consumers may avoid them by increasing the total value of their order beyond the minimum threshold. As a result, they do not form part of the final price of a unit of the product within the meaning of the directive. The Court further emphasized that including such variable and conditional costs in the selling price could undermine price transparency and hinder consumers’ ability to compare offers effectively. By contrast, indicating those costs separately—provided they are clearly disclosed—better serves the objectives of Directive 98/6, namely ensuring precise, transparent, and unambiguous price information. The Court also noted that an average consumer is capable of combining the product price with any additional fees to determine the total amount payable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that EU law does not require flat-rate processing fees, which depend on the total order value and apply only below a minimum threshold, to be included in the selling price, as long as those fees are clearly indicated and do not become unavoidable in practice.

Heritage or Hype? CJEU Clarifies When Luxury Branding Becomes Misleading

In its judgment of 26 March 2026 (Case C-412/24), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95/EC concerning deceptive trade marks. The case arose from a dispute between luxury leather goods companies regarding the validity of trade marks incorporating the number “1717”, which was perceived by consumers as indicating the historical origin of the brand and suggesting long-standing know-how. The referring court asked whether a trade mark may be considered deceptive where it conveys false information about the age and heritage of the undertaking, leading consumers to infer that the goods possess qualities such as prestige or superior craftsmanship. In particular, the question was whether such misleading indications, although relating formally to the undertaking rather than directly to the product, could nonetheless fall within the prohibition of deceptive marks. The Court held that a trade mark may be refused or declared invalid where it creates actual deception or a sufficiently serious risk of deception regarding the characteristics of the goods. It clarified that, while misleading information about the undertaking itself is not sufficient as such, it may fall within Article 3(1)(g) where it leads consumers to infer incorrect characteristics of the goods, such as quality or prestige. In the luxury sector, those intangible elements—linked to heritage, craftsmanship, and brand image—may constitute essential product characteristics. Accordingly, the Court found that the inclusion in a trade mark of a date perceived as indicating the historical establishment of a business may be deceptive where it falsely suggests long-standing know-how that enhances the perceived quality and prestige of the goods. This is particularly relevant where consumers attach significant importance to heritage in their purchasing decisions. The final assessment remains for the national court, which must determine how the mark is perceived by the relevant public and whether it conveys such misleading associations.

Defective Products Liability in the EU: CJEU Confirms Fault Claims, Clarifies Limitation Periods, and Upholds 10-Year Longstop

In its judgment of 26 March 2026 (Case C-338/24), the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products, in a case concerning a claim for damages following vaccination and the impact of a progressive illness on limitation periods. The referring court asked, in particular, whether EU law allows parallel reliance on fault-based liability, how to determine the starting point of the three-year limitation period, and whether the directive’s 10-year longstop is compatible with the right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter. The Court held, first, that Article 13 of the directive does not preclude injured persons from bringing claims under national fault-based liability systems, provided that those claims are based on a different legal basis than the strict liability regime established by the directive. It confirmed that conduct such as maintaining a product on the market despite knowledge of its risks, or failing to comply with duties of vigilance, may constitute independent fault capable of giving rise to liability. As regards limitation periods, the Court clarified that the three-year period under Article 10(1) begins when the claimant becomes aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of the producer. It rejected the interpretation that this period only starts upon stabilization of the damage, holding instead that it is sufficient that the damage has become apparent and can be linked to the product, irrespective of its subsequent evolution. Finally, the Court upheld the validity of the 10-year longstop period laid down in Article 11, finding that it does not infringe the right of access to a court. It emphasized that the provision pursues legitimate objectives of legal certainty and balanced allocation of risk, and that injured persons retain a real opportunity to bring proceedings within the prescribed time limits, including in cases involving progressive harm.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: January and February 2026

Jurisprudência

January and February 2026 saw a number of relevant judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressing important issues in consumer law. These decisions contribute to clarifying the interpretation of EU directives and regulations and further develop core principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of rulings delivered in these months, highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Air Carriers Must Reimburse Intermediary Commissions as Part of the Ticket Price After Flight Cancellations

On 15 January 2026, the CJEU clarified the scope of Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, read in conjunction with Article 5(1)(a) thereof, concerning the reimbursement of airline ticket prices following flight cancellations where tickets are purchased through intermediaries. The case (C-45/24), referred by the Austrian Supreme Court, arose from proceedings brought by the Austrian consumer association VKI against KLM, seeking reimbursement of an agency commission charged by an online booking platform when passengers purchased tickets that were later cancelled. The Court held that the “price of the ticket” to be reimbursed includes the intermediary’s commission paid by the passenger, even where the air carrier was unaware of the exact amount of that commission. Emphasising that such commissions constitute an unavoidable component of the ticket price in a single transaction authorised by the carrier, the Court rejected an interpretation that would make reimbursement conditional on the carrier’s precise knowledge of the commission. Such an approach, it reasoned, would undermine the high level of passenger protection pursued by Regulation No 261/2004, risk delaying reimbursement, and potentially deter consumers from using intermediaries. The judgment thus reinforces the effectiveness and simplicity of passenger reimbursement rights, while allocating the commercial risk associated with intermediary practices to air carriers rather than consumers.

Rome II Applies to Directors’ Tort Liability for Unlicensed Online Gambling, with Damage Occurring at the Player’s Residence

On 15 January 2026, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Articles 1(2)(d) and 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007) in a case concerning the tort liability of company directors for losses arising from unlicensed online gambling activities. The case (C-77/24, Wunner (i)), referred by the Austrian Supreme Court, arose from an action brought by an Austrian consumer seeking recovery of gambling losses from the directors of a Maltese online gambling company that operated in Austria without the licence required under national law. The Court held, first, that such an action does not fall within the exclusion for “non-contractual obligations arising out of the law of companies” under Article 1(2)(d) Rome II, since the alleged liability is based on the infringement of a general statutory prohibition, external to the internal organisation or management of the company. Second, the Court ruled that, for the purposes of Article 4(1) Rome II, the place where the damage occurred is the Member State in which the player is habitually resident, as this is where the protected interest is harmed and where participation in the unlawful online gambling activity takes place. By anchoring both the applicable law and the localisation of damage to the player’s residence, the judgment enhances legal certainty and predictability, while strengthening consumer protection against cross-border illegal gambling practices and facilitating effective private enforcement against company directors.

Banks May Raise a Plea of Set-off Following the Invalidation of a Consumer Credit Agreement Containing Unfair Terms

On 22 January 2026, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in RM and EM v Santander Bank Polska S.A. (Case C-902/24), clarifying the interpretation of Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, read in light of the principle of effectiveness, in the context of restitution following the invalidation of a consumer credit agreement due to unfair terms. The reference for a preliminary ruling was made by a Polish court in proceedings brought by two consumers seeking repayment of amounts paid under a mortgage loan agreement declared void as a result of unfair terms. In response to the consumers’ restitution claim, the bank raised, in the alternative, a plea of set-off corresponding to the loan principal. The Court recalled that, where an unfair term renders a contract incapable of continuing in existence, EU law does not itself determine the legal consequences of that invalidity, which remain governed by national law, subject to compliance with EU consumer protection requirements. It held that Directive 93/13/EEC does not preclude national legislation allowing a seller or supplier to raise, in the alternative, a plea of set-off against the consumer’s restitution claim, provided that such a claim is not treated as due before the contract has been definitively invalidated and does not undermine the effectiveness of the protection conferred on consumers. The Court further emphasised that national rules on procedural costs must not have a dissuasive effect on consumers seeking to exercise their rights under the directive. The judgment thus confirms that national restitution and set-off mechanisms may be compatible with EU consumer law, while reaffirming that their application must not weaken the deterrent effect of the unfair terms regime or discourage consumers from seeking judicial protection. The decision has been commented on, inter alia, Courthouse News and NOVA Consumer Lab, highlighting both its practical implications for mortgage litigation and the open questions it leaves from a consumer law perspective.

Pre-Action Disclosure in Competition Damages Claims Must Respect the Plausibility Threshold, Even in Consumer Collective Actions

On 29 January 2026, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU in a case concerning access to evidence prior to the bringing of a competition damages action on behalf of consumers. The case (C-286/24), referred for a preliminary ruling by the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Supreme Court, Portugal), arose from a dispute between Meliá Hotels International and Associação Ius Omnibus regarding a request for disclosure of documents intended to support a potential collective action for damages following a Commission decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. The consumer association sought access to evidence in order to assess the harm allegedly suffered by Portuguese consumers as a result of territorial restrictions in hotel booking conditions. The Court held that Article 5(1) applies to actions brought specifically for the purpose of obtaining disclosure before a damages claim is formally introduced, provided that national law allows such procedural mechanisms. However, the CJEU clarified that a Commission decision establishing a vertical restriction by object does not, in itself, suffice to demonstrate the plausibility of harm for the purposes of ordering disclosure. Unlike cartels, vertical infringements do not benefit from the presumption of harm under Article 17(2) of the Directive, and claimants — including consumer representative bodies — must present reasonably available evidence capable of supporting the plausibility of damage and a causal link. The Court further emphasised that the plausibility requirement does not amount to a full evidentiary standard, but it must prevent speculative or purely exploratory requests. The judgment thus strengthens procedural tools available for consumer collective redress in competition matters, while safeguarding proportionality and legal certainty in the disclosure of evidence.

No General Presumption of Confidentiality for Member States’ Votes in Comitology Procedures

On 5 February 2026, the CJEU clarified the scope of public access to documents in the context of comitology procedures, in a case concerning the disclosure of Member States’ individual votes cast within a committee assisting the Commission in the adoption of an implementing regulation of general application. The case (C-540/23 P), referred to the Court of Justice on appeal by the European Commission against Covington & Burling LLP and Mr Bart Van Vooren, arose from a request for access to documents revealing how Member States voted within the PAFF Committee during the preparation of a draft regulation amending Annex III to Regulation No 1925/2006 on substances added to food. The Commission argued that disclosure of those individual votes would seriously undermine its decision-making process and that the comitology framework reflected structural confidentiality protecting national positions. The Court held that, although such votes constitute opinions expressed as part of internal deliberations, the regulatory framework governing comitology does not establish a general presumption of non-disclosure. It confirmed that institutions must carry out a specific and concrete assessment of the actual risk associated with disclosure and cannot rely on abstract reasoning concerning the need to preserve cooperation between Member States. The CJEU further emphasised that increased openness enhances democratic legitimacy and accountability, particularly where implementing measures may affect consumers and EU citizens as a whole. The judgment thus reaffirms that comitology procedures are subject to the EU’s constitutional commitment to transparency and that exceptions to access to documents must be interpreted strictly.

Member States May Prohibit GMO (genetically modified organism) Cultivation Without Specific Justification Under Transitional Mechanism

On 5 February 2026, the CJEU ruled on the validity of Article 26c(1) and (3) of Directive 2001/18, as amended by Directive 2015/412, in joined preliminary ruling proceedings concerning national prohibitions on the cultivation of MON 810 genetically modified maize. The cases (C-364/24 and C-393/24), referred by the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy) and the Tribunale di Udine (District Court, Udine, Italy), arose from disputes brought by Mr Giorgio Fidenato following orders to destroy GMO maize crops and the imposition of administrative fines for breaching the Italian prohibition implemented pursuant to Commission Implementing Decision 2016/321. The referring courts questioned whether allowing Member States, during the transitional period, to demand an adjustment of the geographical scope of an existing GMO authorisation without providing specific justification was compatible with the free movement of goods, proportionality, non-discrimination, freedom to conduct a business, and WTO obligations. The Court held that the mechanism established in Article 26c(1) and (3) is valid, emphasising that cultivation prohibitions adopted under that procedure require the tacit consent of the authorisation holder and do not affect the free circulation of authorised GMO products as goods. It further clarified that such measures do not undermine consumers’ freedom of choice, since authorised GMO products may continue to be marketed and consumed within the internal market. The CJEU confirmed that the EU legislature acted within its broad discretion under Article 114 TFEU, balancing internal market objectives with subsidiarity and national flexibility regarding land use. The Court also ruled that decisions adopted under Article 26c(1) and (3) need not rely on the specific grounds listed in Article 26b(3), and that Implementing Decision 2016/321 does not preclude national penalties that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

Compliance of a Mortgage Loan Interest Clause Based on a Regulated Benchmark Does Not in Itself Render the Term Unfair

On 12 February 2026, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Articles 1(2), 4(2) and 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, read in conjunction with Regulation 2016/1011, in a case concerning the fairness and transparency of a variable interest rate clause in a mortgage loan agreement concluded with a consumer. The case (C-471/24), referred by a Polish court, arose from proceedings between a consumer and a bank regarding a loan indexed to the WIBOR 6M benchmark, where the consumer argued that the clause was unfair due to the methodology of that index and the bank’s role as a contributing entity. The Court held, first, that Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 does not exclude such a term from review where national law merely lays down a general framework for determining interest rates while leaving the professional free to choose the benchmark and margin. Secondly, the CJEU ruled that the transparency requirement under Article 4(2) does not oblige the creditor to provide detailed information on the methodology of the benchmark, provided that it has complied with the information duties laid down in Directive 2014/17 and has not given the consumer a distorted picture of the index. Thirdly, the Court found that the fact that the benchmark methodology may rely on input data not strictly corresponding to actual transactions, and that the creditor is one of the contributing banks, does not in itself create a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer, where the index complied with Regulation 2016/1011 at the time of contract conclusion. The judgment thus confirms that the mere use of a regulated benchmark in a mortgage loan agreement does not automatically render the interest clause unfair, while preserving the consumer’s right to judicial review of the term as a whole under Directive 93/13.

Política de «no show» das companhias aéreas: uma mudança de paradigma

Jurisprudência

Por João Carminho

No início de 2023, deparei-me com uma situação que me pareceu, imediatamente, injusta: a política de “no show”, adotada por algumas companhias aéreas, traduzida no cancelamento automático de viagens de volta quando os consumidores não compareçam nas respetivas viagens de ida e/ou na cobrança de penalidades pelo não comparecimento nessas viagens de ida.

No caso concreto, a companhia aérea era a Sata Internacional – Azores Airlines, S.A. (“Sata”) e estava em causa uma viagem Lisboa-Ponta Delgada-Lisboa.

Após alguma pesquisa, concluí que esta prática já tinha sido declarada ilegal em vários países, inclusive da União Europeia, por contender com diversas normas de direito do consumo equivalentes às vigentes em Portugal.

E a razão é simples: a obrigação dos consumidores neste tipo de contrato (de prestação de serviços de transporte aéreo) não é – nem pode ser – a “apresentação no voo de ida” (nem – acrescente-se, no voo de volta), mas sim, e tão só, o pagamento do preço por cada um desses voos, sem prejuízo de outras obrigações acessórias (por exemplo, a realização do check-in), impostas por razões de segurança.

As companhias aéreas – essas sim – obrigam-se a transportar os consumidores na viagem de ida e na viagem de volta, independentemente de os mesmos não comparecerem na primeira e comparecerem na segunda (ou vice-versa), o que (algumas delas) se recusam a fazer, com o impacto – financeiro e logístico – causado na vida dos consumidores.

Com esta prática, as companhias “baralham”, assim, as obrigações contratuais de cada uma das partes – e fazem-no em seu próprio benefício, já que assim podem voltar a vender as viagens automaticamente canceladas ao preço de mercado nesse momento (geralmente superior ao preço inicial, por ser mais próximo da data da viagem), obtendo, por essa via, um duplo – e injustificado – enriquecimento (que pode ser ainda maior em casos de overbooking).

Confrontado com esta realidade, decidi, a título pessoal e em auto-representação, propor uma ação popular inibitória contra a Sata, tendo em vista a declaração de nulidade da política de “no show” e a sua proibição de aplicação futura por parte daquela companhia aérea.

Na tentativa de justificar a legalidade desta prática, a Sata procurou enquadrá-la nas suas políticas internas, nas suas tarifas (complexas, de difícil leitura e sujeitas a alterações ao longo do tempo) e num conceito muito particular de “viagem sequencial”.

Segundo esta tese, quando um consumidor compra uma viagem de ida e volta, está a adquirir uma única viagem.

No entanto, não é isso que resulta do processo de compra deste tipo de viagens (em que o consumidor começa por escolher a viagem de ida, por um preço, e a viagem de volta, por outro preço), nem da realidade fáctica / empírica da situação. É que o consumidor, ao adquirir este tipo de viagens, está a reservar dois voos distintos, em circunstâncias de tempo e espaço diferentes, com duas passagens / cartões de embarque distintos e tem de fazer dois check-ins. Trata-se, portanto, de duas viagens distintas e independentes, com um preço autonomizável, podendo uma existir sem a outra.

E se assim é, e se os consumidores pagam por cada um desses voos, as companhias aéreas não têm outra obrigação senão a de os transportar, independentemente de aqueles comparecerem num voo e noutro não, bem como da tarifa escolhida.

Neste sentido, o Tribunal Judicial da Comarca dos Açores (Juízo Local Cível de Ponta Delgada), proferiu, em julho de 2025, sentença a declarar, em suma, esta prática “nula e proibida, quer por violação do n.º 1 [direito à proteção dos interesses económicos dos consumidores], alínea b) do n.º 2 [obrigação de não inclusão de cláusulas que originem um significativo desequilíbrio em detrimento do consumidor] e n.º 6 do artigo 9.º [proibição de fazer depender o fornecimento de um serviço da aquisição ou da prestação de outro ou outros] da Lei de Defesa do Consumidor e da al. b) do art. 22.º da LCCG [proibição de cláusulas que permitam a quem as predisponha resolver o contrato sem motivo justificativo], quer porque contende com o princípio da boa-fé (cfr. arts. 15.º e 16.º, deste último diploma legal)”.

Já quanto aos argumentos avançados pela Sata, de cariz essencialmente económico (possibilidade de estabelecer tarifas mais flexíveis e reduzidas, necessidade de adequação ao mercado altamente concorrencial, gestão dinâmica dos preços, fomento da concorrência entre transportadoras aéreas, melhoria da conectividade e redução do desperdício da capacidade das aeronaves), entendeu o Tribunal que “tais fatores não legitimam a prática abusiva das cláusulas de «no show», impostas pela ré sem qualquer tratamento diferenciado, correspondendo ao recebimento de uma prestação (preço) sem a correspondente contraprestação”.

Esta decisão transitou em julgado em setembro de 2025 e assume particular relevância num contexto em que a política de “no show” continua a ser aplicada em Portugal por outras companhias aéreas.

Mais do que resolver um litígio concreto, esta decisão contribui para clarificar o enquadramento jurídico dos direitos dos passageiros aéreos e evidencia o papel das ações populares enquanto instrumento de tutela coletiva dos consumidores no ordenamento jurídico português.

Herchoski (C-902/24): key holdings and open questions from a consumer law perspective

Jurisprudência

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 22 January 2026 in Herchoski (C-902/24) addresses a set of recurring and sensitive issues concerning the consequences of the nullity of consumer credit agreements containing unfair terms, in particular mortgage loans indexed to foreign currencies. Beyond the specific point of short deadlines for restitution, the judgment clarifies some aspects of EU consumer law, while leaving others only partially resolved.

1. Set-off between restitution claims following the nullity of the contract

The Court confirms that EU law does not, in principle, preclude national rules allowing the set-off of reciprocal restitution claims arising from the nullity of a consumer credit agreement (paras 59–66, 85). In particular, it distinguishes set-off from mechanisms such as a right of retention previously found incompatible with Directive 93/13, stressing that set-off, as understood under Polish law, produces effects equivalent to reciprocal payments and does not, as such, deprive the consumer of default interest (paras 63–66).

At the same time, the Court recalls that the bank may not obtain any remuneration for the use of the capital beyond reimbursement of the principal and statutory default interest, in line with its earlier case-law (para. 73).

2. Set-off invoked in the alternative by the seller or supplier

The Court accepts that a bank may raise a plea of set-off in the alternative, while maintaining as its principal argument that the contract is valid (paras 70–72, 85). This conclusion is grounded in both the right to effective judicial protection and the principle of equality of arms, which also apply to sellers or suppliers in consumer disputes.

However, the Court draws a crucial limit: as long as the bank continues to argue that the contract is valid, its restitution claim cannot be regarded as due. Any formal notice served on the consumer before the judicial declaration of nullity must therefore be considered ineffective, in particular for the purposes of default interest (para. 74).

3. Short deadlines for restitution of the loan capital

The issue of short deadlines imposed on consumers for the restitution of the loan capital is the point at which the judgment is at its most cautious, and, arguably, most problematic. The Court acknowledges that the duration of the payment period is governed by national law, but insists that, in light of all the circumstances, it must not be such as to deter or prevent consumers from exercising the rights conferred by Directive 93/13 (para. 75).

However, the Court refrains from articulating any substantive criteria for assessing when a deadline becomes dissuasive. It does not indicate whether a period such as the 14-day deadline at issue in the main proceedings is, in itself, incompatible with EU law, nor does it expressly engage with the economic reality of mortgage credit. In most cases, the loan capital has been irreversibly used to acquire the property, making its immediate restitution not merely difficult, but potentially impossible. The risk faced by consumers is therefore not limited to procedural inconvenience, but extends to default, insolvency, or loss of the home.

Rather than confronting this structural constraint directly, the Court links the assessment of the deadline to the duty of the national court to inform the consumer, in an objective and comprehensive manner, of the legal consequences of nullity before it takes effect (paras 67 and 75). This approach places considerable weight on information and individual choice, assuming that a fully informed consumer can meaningfully decide whether to invoke nullity.

From a consumer law perspective, this assumption is open to serious doubt. Even perfect information does not neutralise structural economic asymmetry. Where the consumer lacks any realistic capacity to repay the capital within a short time frame, the choice between invoking nullity and maintaining a contract containing unfair terms may be largely illusory. By treating the problem primarily as one of information rather than of economic feasibility, the Court effectively shifts the burden of managing this tension onto national courts, without providing clear guidance on how to resolve it.

4. Centrality of the informed intention of the consumer

The judgment reiterates that the protection afforded by Directive 93/13 ultimately depends on the consumer’s intention. If, after being duly informed by the national court of the consequences of removing the unfair terms, the consumer does not oppose the declaration of nullity, the resulting restitution mechanisms, including set-off, are not contrary to EU law (paras 67–69).

This emphasis reinforces the role of information and consent, but also raises questions as to the extent to which consumer choice can be regarded as genuinely free in situations of structural economic constraint.

5. Allocation of costs and the principle of effectiveness

As regards costs, the Court recalls that this matter falls within the procedural autonomy of the Member States, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (paras 76–77). While consumers may, in principle, bear some costs, national rules must not deter them from exercising their rights under Directive 93/13 (paras 78–79).

Importantly, the Court stresses the obligation of national courts to interpret domestic procedural rules in conformity with EU law, making use, where necessary, of corrective mechanisms that allow for a more equitable allocation of costs (paras 80–83). At the same time, it leaves room for courts to take into account possible bad faith on the part of consumers who challenge a set-off without justification (para. 84).

6. Overall assessment

The Herchoski judgment does not signal a reversal of the Court’s consumer-protective case-law, but rather a phase of consolidation and restraint. The Court confirms that set-off mechanisms and procedural defences available under national law are not, in themselves, incompatible with Directive 93/13, while insisting on safeguards relating to the timing of restitution claims, the absence of remuneration for capital, and the need to avoid dissuasive effects.

At the same time, several crucial issues, most notably the practical impact of short restitution deadlines and the limits of consumer autonomy in contexts of economic constraint, are left unresolved and largely entrusted to national courts. The effectiveness of consumer protection in this area will therefore continue to depend, to a significant extent, on how those courts operationalise the principles laid down by the Court of Justice.

7. Policy implications

From a policy perspective, the Herchoski judgment highlights the growing tension between traditional restitutionary logic and the objectives of EU consumer protection in long-term credit relationships. If the effectiveness of the rights conferred by Directive 93/13 is to be preserved, legislators and courts alike may need to reflect on whether immediate restitution of the loan capital, following the nullity of a mortgage credit agreement, should remain the default solution. Possible avenues include statutory or judicially recognised mechanisms for the deferment or staged repayment of the capital, clearer rules on the moment at which restitution claims become enforceable, and a more explicit integration of consumers’ economic capacity into the assessment of dissuasive effects. Without such adjustments, there is a risk that the formal availability of consumer rights will coexist with practical barriers that prevent their meaningful exercise. The Herchoski judgment thus invites a broader reflection on how EU consumer law can reconcile legal coherence with economic reality in the context of housing finance.

Review of the case law of the European Court of Justice: December 2025

Jurisprudência

December 2025 brought a series of noteworthy judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), shaping key aspects of consumer law. These decisions not only clarify the interpretation of EU directives and regulations but also reinforce fundamental principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of the most relevant rulings delivered in the last month (end of November and December to date), highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Consumers Cannot Be Burdened with Disproportionate Court Costs After Contracts Are Annulled for Unfair Terms

On 27 November 2025, the CJEU clarified the scope of Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, read in light of the principle of effectiveness, in a case concerning the allocation of court costs following the annulment of a consumer credit agreement containing unfair terms. The case (C-746/24), referred by the Regional Court of Warsaw, arose from an action brought by Bank Millennium SA seeking restitution of the loan capital after a Swiss-franc-denominated loan agreement had been declared invalid at the consumer’s request. The Court held that EU law precludes national legislation under which a consumer, acting as defendant, may be ordered to bear court costs significantly higher than those applicable had the consumer been unsuccessful in an action brought on their own initiative to challenge the unfair terms. Such cost asymmetry is liable to deter consumers from exercising or defending their EU-law rights, undermining both effective judicial protection and the deterrent effect of Directive 93/13. While reaffirming Member States’ procedural autonomy, the judgment requires national courts to interpret domestic cost rules in conformity with EU law so as to avoid disproportionate financial burdens on consumers, thereby reinforcing consumer protection, legal certainty and the effectiveness of judicial review in unfair-terms litigation.

Order for Payment Procedures May Limit the Effects of Unfair Terms Review, Provided Consumers Retain Full Judicial Protection

On 27 November 2025, the CJEU ruled on the compatibility of Spanish order for payment procedures with Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, interpreted in light of the principle of effectiveness, in a case concerning the ex officio review of unfair contractual terms and the procedural rights of consumers. The case (C-509/24), referred by the Court of First Instance and Preliminary Investigations No 3 of Arucas (Spain), arose from an application by Investcapital Ltd for an order for payment based on a bank account contract concluded with a consumer. The Court held that EU law does not preclude national legislation under which the court, in expedited order for payment proceedings, may merely propose a reduction of the claimed amount by excluding sums derived from terms considered unfair, without formally declaring those terms void, nor prevent the creditor from pursuing the excluded amounts in subsequent proceedings. Such a system is compatible with Directive 93/13 provided that the consumer can obtain, in other proceedings, a declaration of invalidity of the unfair term and that the order for payment does not produce res judicata effects. The Court further ruled that EU law does not require consumer participation at this preliminary review stage, as long as the principle of audi alteram partem is fully respected in later inter partes proceedings. The judgment thus confirms Member States’ procedural autonomy in designing summary recovery mechanisms, while reaffirming that effective consumer protection must ultimately be ensured through access to full judicial review of unfair terms.

Territorial Jurisdiction for Collective Damages Actions Arising from Anticompetitive Conduct on Online Platforms

On 2 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis) in the context of representative actions for damages arising from alleged anticompetitive conduct on digital platforms. The case (C-34/24), referred by the District Court of Amsterdam, concerned collective actions brought by two Dutch foundations against Apple Distribution International Ltd and Apple Inc., seeking compensation for damage allegedly suffered by users of the App Store in the Netherlands due to the imposition of excessive commissions in breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Court held that, where an online platform is specifically directed at the market of a Member State, the place where the damage occurred corresponds to the entire territory of that State, even if individual purchases were made online and the users are unidentified but identifiable. Consequently, any court in that Member State having substantive jurisdiction may exercise both international and territorial jurisdiction over a representative action covering all affected users, regardless of their precise location within the State. This approach ensures proximity, predictability and sound administration of justice, avoids fragmentation of jurisdiction and facilitates effective enforcement of competition law in the digital economy, while confirming that collective redress mechanisms do not alter the application of Article 7(2) but may justify a centralised jurisdictional solution.

Subsequent Targeting of a Consumer’s Member State Does Not Alter the Law Applicable to an Existing Contract

On 4 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (Rome I), read in conjunction with Article 3, in a case concerning the temporal scope of consumer protection rules in cross-border banking relationships. The case (C-279/24), referred by the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), arose from a dispute between AY, a consumer residing in Italy, and Liechtensteinische Landesbank (Österreich) AG, regarding losses allegedly suffered in connection with financial products purchased under an ongoing contractual relationship governed by Austrian law. The Court held that Article 6(1) does not apply where the professional did not pursue or direct its activities to the consumer’s Member State at the time the contract was concluded, even if such targeting occurs subsequently during the contractual relationship. Allowing the applicable law to change retroactively would undermine the predictability of conflict-of-law rules, the principle of legal certainty, and the freedom of choice enshrined in Article 3, which constitutes a cornerstone of Rome I. The CJEU further confirmed that later financial transactions carried out under an existing framework agreement do not, in themselves, constitute a new contractual relationship capable of triggering Article 6. The judgment thus reinforces that consumer protection under Rome I is determined at the moment of contract formation, preventing ex post reclassification of the applicable law based on later market-targeting conduct.

Submission of a Set-Off Declaration Cannot Imply Waiver of Limitation Defense in Unfair Loan Litigation

On 11 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the scope of Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, read in light of the principle of effectiveness, in a case concerning the procedural consequences of annulment of a consumer mortgage loan contract containing unfair terms. The case (C-767/24, Kuszycka), referred by the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland), arose from restitution proceedings brought by mBank S.A. against a consumer, ML, seeking repayment of the loan capital after the contract had to be declared void, despite the bank’s claim being time-barred under national law. The Court held that EU law precludes national case-law under which the consumer’s submission of a declaration of set-off is automatically treated as an implied waiver of the objection that the seller’s claim is time-barred, even where that objection is raised expressly and simultaneously. Such an interpretation is liable to deter consumers from exercising procedural rights, undermine the dissuasive effect of the prohibition of unfair terms, and allow the seller or supplier to benefit from its own unlawful conduct. The CJEU emphasised that a waiver of limitation cannot be presumed without verifying the consumer’s free and informed intention, regardless of legal representation, and confirmed that national courts must disapply incompatible case-law in order to ensure effective consumer protection and the full effectiveness of Directive 93/13.

Distributors May Be Sanctioned for Incorrect Nicotine Labelling, but Flat-Rate Fines Breach the Principle of Proportionality

On 11 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Articles 23(2) and 23(3) of Directive 2014/40/EU, read in conjunction with Article 2(40) and Article 20(4)(b)(i), in a case concerning administrative penalties imposed on distributors of refill containers for electronic cigarettes bearing incorrect indications of nicotine content. The case (C-665/24), referred by the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands), arose from fines imposed on Diamond Flavours BV and UEG Holland BV for supplying refill containers to retail outlets where the nicotine content indicated on the unit packets exceeded the actual content. The CJEU held, first, that the obligation to ensure that non-compliant products are not placed on the market applies at all stages of the supply chain, including the supply by distributors to retail outlets, and is not limited to sales to consumers. Secondly, the Court ruled that while strict liability regimes and fines of a criminal nature may be compatible with Directive 2014/40 in light of the objective of ensuring a high level of health protection, national legislation imposing flat-rate fines that cannot be adjusted to reflect the seriousness of the breach and the individual circumstances of the case is disproportionate and therefore precluded by EU law. The judgment thus confirms broad enforcement powers against distributors, while reaffirming that penalty systems must respect proportionality and cannot disregard the concrete gravity of the infringement, even where consumer health protection is at stake.

National Regulatory Authorities May Impose Broad Information Obligations on Parcel Delivery Operators, Subject to Proportionality

On 18 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the scope of the powers of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in the postal sector under Regulation 2018/644 and Directive 97/67 in a case concerning general and symmetrical obligations to provide information imposed by the Italian authority AGCOM on parcel delivery service providers. The case (C-345/24), referred by the Consiglio di Stato (Italy), arose from challenges brought by several operators against regulatory measures requiring disclosure of information on pricing conditions, contractual arrangements with undertakings contributing to the provision of services, and the economic and legal conditions of workers, including subcontracted labour. The CJEU held, first, that Regulation 2018/644 applies to all parcel delivery service providers, irrespective of whether the services concerned are domestic or cross-border, save for specific exclusions. Secondly, the Court distinguished ex ante regulatory powers aimed at monitoring markets and preventing distortions of competitionfrom the ex post application of competition law, holding that the former may justify broad information requestsenabling a forward-looking assessment of market conditions. Lastly, the CJEU ruled that Articles 22 and 22a of Directive 97/67 and Article 4 of Regulation 2018/644 do not preclude an NRA from imposing such obligations, provided that they are suitable to ensure the performance of the authority’s tasks, necessary for that purpose and proportionate, in that they do not impose an undue administrative burden on operators, the assessment of proportionality being a matter for the referring court.

Res Judicata Cannot Prevent Ex Officio Review of Unfair Penalty Clauses After Cassation

On 18 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the scope of Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, read in light of the principle of effectiveness and Article 47 of the Charter, in a case concerning the ex officio review of unfair contractual terms in proceedings remitted following cassation. The case (C-320/24), referred by the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy), arose from litigation between two consumers and a property developer admitted to insolvency proceedings, relating to the termination of a preliminary contract for the sale of immovable property and the validity of a penalty clause allowing the seller to retain advance payments in the event of non-performance. The Court held that EU law precludes national procedural rules under which the principle of res judicata prevents a national court, to which a case has been remitted following cassation, from examining of its own motion the unfairness of a contractual term, where neither the consumer nor the national courts had previously carried out such a review. Such an approach is liable to render consumer protection ineffective, allow unfair terms to be treated as implicitly valid without any reasoned judicial assessment, and undermine the dissuasive effect of Directive 93/13. The CJEU emphasised that the obligation to review unfair terms cannot be neutralised by rules on finality, even where the consumer raised the unfairness only at a late stage of the proceedings, and confirmed that national courts must disapply procedural rules that make the exercise of consumer rights impossible or excessively difficult.

Margin Squeeze Analysis Requires Dominance on the Upstream Market and a Substitutability-Based Market Definition

On 18 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU in a case concerning the assessment of an alleged margin squeeze by a vertically integrated undertaking active in the wholesale fuel market, with potential adverse effects on competition and consumer welfare. The case (C-260/24), referred by the Administrativen sad Sofia-oblast (Bulgaria), arose from proceedings between Lukoil Bulgaria EOOD and the Bulgarian competition authority concerning a finding of abuse of a dominant position based on pricing practices whereby fuel sold after payment of excise duty was priced below fuel sold under an excise duty suspension arrangement. The Court held that, in order to establish a margin squeeze, a competition authority must demonstrate the existence of a dominant position on the upstream market, on the basis of market shares or other relevant structural characteristics, and must show that the prices applied on a linked downstream market are capable of producing an exclusionary effect on competitors that are at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking, to the detriment of effective competition and ultimately of consumers. The CJEU further ruled that only products displaying a sufficient degree of substitutability may be included in the same relevant product market, and that while fuels such as petrol and diesel may be grouped together at wholesale level depending on storage and supply conditions, the exclusion of LPG must be objectively justified by differences in infrastructure, transport or regulatory requirements, which it is for the national court to verify.

Trade Marks Corresponding to Designers’ Names May Be Revoked if Their Use Misleads Consumers as to Creative Origin

On 18 December 2025, the CJEUclarified the interpretation of Article 12(2)(b) of Directive 2008/95 and Article 20(b) of Directive (EU) 2015/2436 in a case concerning the revocation of trade marks liable to mislead the public following their assignment. The case (C-168/24), referred by the Cour de cassation (France), arose from proceedings between PMJC SAS and the designer [W] [X], [M] [X] and [X] Créative SAS, his heirs and a related company, concerning the use of trade marks corresponding to the designer’s surname in such a way as to make the public believe that he was still involved in the design of the goods bearing those marks. The Court held that EU law does not preclude the revocation of a trade mark consisting of a designer’s name where, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, the use made of that mark gives rise to actual deception or a sufficiently serious risk of deception as to the creative origin of the goods, even though the mere fact that the designer is no longer involved is not, in itself, sufficient. The CJEU emphasised that the assessment must focus on the perception of the average consumer, that creative origin may constitute a relevant product characteristic capable of misleading the public, and that trade mark protection cannot be used as an unfair instrument to attract consumers by fostering a false belief as to the designer’s involvement.

Royalties Charged by Copyright Collecting Societies Must Reflect Hotel Room Occupancy to Avoid Unfair Prices under Article 102 TFEU

On 18 December 2025, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Article 102(a) TFEU in a case concerning the calculation of copyright royalties by a collective management organisation in a dominant position. The case (C-161/24), referred by the Krajský soud v Brně (Czech Republic), arose from proceedings between OSA, z.s., a copyright collective management organisation, and the Czech competition authority concerning fines imposed for charging hotel establishments royalties calculated without taking account of room occupancy rates. The Court held that EU law does not preclude finding an abuse of dominant position where royalties are calculated on a flat-rate basis that ignores actual or foreseeable occupancy, since the economic value of the licence depends on the scope of actual use, and such a method may lead to unfair prices within the meaning of Article 102(a) TFEU. The CJEU emphasised that the assessment must consider all relevant circumstances, including the feasibility of taking occupancy into account, that no proof of direct consumer harm is required where the practice is capable of impairing the competitive structure, and that an appreciable effect on trade between Member States may be established where the collecting society also manages the rights of foreign rightholders, thereby potentially affecting consumers and market conditions beyond the national level.

Direito de arrependimento em contratos de crédito ao consumo: notas ao Acórdão Mercedes-Benz Bank e Volkswagen Bank

Jurisprudência

O Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia (TJUE) pronunciou-se, no Acórdão C-143/23, sobre um tema sensível no regime do crédito ao consumo: o momento em que começa a correr o prazo para o exercício do direito de arrependimento. O caso, que envolveu contratos de crédito para compra de automóveis, coloca no centro do debate os deveres de informação a cargo do mutuante, bem como o alcance da proteção do consumidor neste domínio.

Entre os pontos submetidos ao Tribunal figurava a seguinte questão: pode o consumidor exercer o direito de arrependimento se o contrato não indicar, sob a forma de percentagem concreta, a taxa de juros de mora aplicável? O Tribunal considerou que, enquanto faltar essa informação obrigatória, o prazo para exercício do direito de arrependimento não começa a correr, o que tem consequências relevantes para a prática contratual.

Entendeu o TJUE que o início do prazo de 14 dias depende da comunicação, ao consumidor, de informações obrigatórias previstas no artigo 10.º, n.º 2, da Diretiva 2008/48/CE, especificamente a taxa de juros de mora aplicável ao contrato. O Tribunal esclareceu que não basta uma menção genérica: a taxa deve ser comunicada de forma clara e compreensível.

Além disso, concluiu que a informação em falta pode ser comunicada ao consumidor posteriormente à celebração do contrato, caso não conste desse instrumento. A Diretiva não exige que todas as menções obrigatórias figurem no próprio contrato, bastando que sejam «devidamente comunicadas» ao consumidor. O acórdão, no entanto, não fixa um limite temporal para essa comunicação. Assim, enquanto a informação obrigatória não for devidamente prestada, pode entender-se, com base na própria lógica da decisão, que o prazo de 14 dias não chega sequer a iniciar-se ao longo de toda a vigência contratual, independentemente da sua duração. Ademais, o Tribunal não se pronunciou sobre os requisitos formais dessa comunicação posterior, pelo que também essa questão mantém-se em aberto.

Importa notar que o TJUE afasta expressamente qualquer indagação sobre o conhecimento efetivo do consumidor quanto às informações obrigatórias não prestadas pelo profissional. Dito de outro modo, é irrelevante que o consumidor, na prática, conhecesse ou não a informação omitida. O que importa é a conduta objetiva do mutuante: enquanto não cumprir integralmente o dever de informação, o prazo para exercício do direito de arrependimento não se inicia.

Quanto à alegação de abuso do direito de arrependimento, o Tribunal concluiu que não há abuso possível enquanto faltar informação obrigatória que cabia ao profissional prestar: o consumidor não pode ser prejudicado pela omissão do próprio mutuante, e a invocação do direito (mesmo após longo decurso de tempo de vigência do contrato) não constitui, por si só, um exercício abusivo do direito de arrependimento. Dito de outra forma, não há abuso de um direito que sequer chegou a aperfeiçoar-se.

Embora o acórdão se refira a contratos de crédito ao consumo ligados à compra de veículos, a sua lógica pode vir a influenciar a interpretação de situações análogas noutros regimes. Reforça-se, assim, o entendimento de que o prazo para o exercício do direito de arrependimento depende do cumprimento prévio dos deveres de informação pelo profissional, sem o qual esse prazo não se inicia.

Ao admitir que a informação em falta pode ser suprida posteriormente, o Tribunal resolve uma dificuldade prática relevante, mas deixa em aberto questões suscetíveis de gerar debate – nomeadamente o momento até ao qual essa comunicação pode ocorrer e a forma adequada para a sua realização, quando não conste inicialmente do contrato. Mesmo assim, o essencial permanece claro: o prazo do direito de arrependimento só se inicia quando o profissional cumpre adequadamente o seu dever de informação.

É, portanto, uma decisão que reforça a proteção do consumidor no regime do crédito ao consumo e evidencia a relevância dos deveres de informação no direito do consumo europeu.

Review of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union: November 2025

Jurisprudência

November 2025 brought a series of noteworthy judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), shaping key aspects of consumer law. These decisions not only clarify the interpretation of EU directives and regulations but also reinforce fundamental principles such as consumer protection, legal certainty, and market fairness. Below is an overview of the most relevant rulings delivered in the last month (end of October and November to date), highlighting their practical implications for businesses, consumers, and regulators across the EU.

Withdrawal Period in Linked Vehicle Credit Agreements Starts Only After Full Disclosure of Mandatory Information

On 30 October 2025, the CJEU clarified that the withdrawal period for a consumer credit agreement linked to a vehicle purchase does not begin until all mandatory information, including the specific interest rate for late payment, has been duly communicated to the consumer. The case (C-143/23), referred by the Regional Court of Ravensburg (Germany) and involving KI v. Mercedes-Benz Bank AG and FA v. Volkswagen Bank GmbH, concerned the scope of the withdrawal right under Directive 2008/48/EC. The Court held that compensation for depreciation must reflect only the actual use of the vehicle, excluding unrelated costs such as dealer margins, resale expenses or VAT. The Court also confirmed that Directive 2008/48 does not fully harmonise the legal consequences of withdrawal, leaving Member States discretion to regulate the repayment of capital and interest provided that national rules do not render the exercise of the withdrawal right impossible or excessively difficult. The ruling reinforces the principle of effectiveness, enhancing consumer protection while maintaining contractual balance within linked credit agreements.

Choice-of-Court Agreements Between Natural Persons Not Invalidated by National Economic-Activity Requirements

On 30 October 2025, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The case (C-398/24), referred by the Supreme Court of Estonia, concerned a dispute between two natural persons regarding the transfer of a flat, in which the parties had agreed that Estonian law would apply and that any disputes would be resolved by a specific Estonian court. The Court held that a national-law condition requiring a link with the economic or professional activity of the parties does not render the choice-of-court agreement “null and void as to its substantive validity” within the meaning of EU law. The judgment strengthens party autonomy and the effectiveness of jurisdiction agreements, ensuring that individuals, including consumers, can rely on predictable contractual arrangements, while preventing national legislation from imposing additional validity conditions that would undermine freedom of choice.

Delay Compensation Must Be Calculated on the Basis of the Originally Scheduled Arrival Time

On 30 October 2025, the CJEU held that when an air carrier postpones a flight and issues a new booking confirmation with revised departure and arrival times, the delay for compensation purposes under Regulation 261/2004 must be assessed by reference to the originally scheduled arrival time. The case (C-558/24), referred by the Regional Court of Landshut (Germany), concerned a dispute between Corendon Airlines Turistik Hava Tasimacilik AS and Myflyright GmbH. The Court confirmed that a mere postponement of flight times, without any change to the route or flight number, constitutes a delay, not a cancellation, and that passengers arriving three hours or more after the originally scheduled time suffer an irreversible loss of time entitling them to compensation. Allowing airlines to rely on unilaterally modified arrival times would undermine the regulation’s objective of ensuring a high level of passenger protection, enabling carriers to avoid liability simply by issuing last-minute confirmations with later times. The Court therefore ruled that the revised booking confirmation is irrelevant for calculating delay length: compensation is due whenever the arrival exceeds the three-hour threshold measured against the initial timetable.

Non-Profit Associations Can Qualify as “Travellers” Under EU Package Travel Rules

On 13 November 2025, the CJEU held that a legal person, such as a non-profit association, that books a package travel contract in its own name but on behalf of its members qualifies as a “traveller” under Article 3(6) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302. The case (C-445/24), referred by the Court of Cassation (Belgium), concerned a dispute between MS Amlin Insurance SE and (W)onderweg VZW. The Court emphasised that the definition of “traveller” (“any person who seeks to conclude a contract or is entitled to travel under a concluded contract”) does not distinguish between natural and legal persons. Even though the association cannot physically travel, it can conclude contracts for the benefit of those who will. Denying such an entity the status of “traveller” would undermine the directive’s objective of ensuring a high level of protection, particularly for vulnerable persons. The ruling ensures that associations and other legal entities acting on behalf of their members may invoke rights such as insolvency protection, confirming that EU law protects the contracting entity, not only the individuals who ultimately travel.

“Non-Alcoholic Gin” Prohibited and Validity of Regulation 2019/787 Confirmed

On 13 November 2025, the CJEU held that a beverage marketed as “non-alcoholic gin” cannot lawfully use the designation “gin” under Regulation 2019/787. The case (C-563/24), referred by the Regional Court of Potsdam (Germany), involved a dispute between Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV and PB Vi Goods GmbH. The Court found that Article 10(7) expressly prohibits the use of protected spirit drink names for products that do not fulfil the category’s essential requirements, including production with ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and reaching a minimum alcoholic strength of 37.5%. The addition of “non-alcoholic” does not circumvent this prohibition, which also extends to qualified or imitative designations. Article 12(1) was held inapplicable because it concerns foodstuffs produced using alcohol, whereas the product at issue was water-based. Turning to validity, the Court rejected the challenge based on Article 16 of the Charter, holding that the restriction affects only the use of the legal name, not the manufacture or sale of non-alcoholic juniper-flavoured beverages. The measure was found suitable and necessary to protect consumers, prevent misleading impressions, safeguard fair competition, and defend the reputation of EU spirit drinks. The Court thus confirmed both the prohibition and the validity of Article 10(7).

Individuals Hiring Lawyers to Form Companies May Be Consumers, Not Undertakings

On 13 November 2025, the CJEU clarified the scope of Directive 2011/7/EU on late payment in commercial transactions and Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts. The case (C-197/24), referred by the City Court of Bratislava IV (Slovakia), concerned a dispute between AK, a legal services company, and RU, a natural person who hired the firm to establish a commercial company of which he intended to become co-founder, member and managing director. The Court held that engaging a lawyer to form a company does not automatically classify the individual as an undertaking, nor does it automatically render the transaction “commercial” under Directive 2011/7. The Court further confirmed that such a person may be regarded as a consumer under Directive 93/13, provided they were not acting within an independent professional or economic activity at the time of contracting. The ruling strengthens legal certainty for individuals entering into legal-service contracts and ensures that national provisions on legal fees are interpreted consistently with EU consumer-protection rules, preventing reclassification as “undertakings” based solely on future entrepreneurial intentions.

Use of Email Addresses for Marketing Must Comply with Directive 2002/58

On 13 November 2025, the CJEU clarified the interpretation of Directive 2002/58 with respect to the use of email addresses for direct marketing. The case (C-654/23), referred by the Court of Appeal of Bucharest (Romania), involved a dispute between Inteligo Media SA and the National Supervisory Authority for the Processing of Personal Data (ANSPDCP). The Court held that a user’s email address is obtained “in the context of the sale of a product or service” when the user creates a free account on an online platform giving access to a limited number of articles, a daily legislative newsletter, and optional paid content. Sending such a newsletter constitutes a use of electronic mail for direct marketing of similar products or services under Article 13(1) and (2) of Directive 2002/58. Furthermore, when unsolicited communications comply with Article 13(2), the conditions for lawful processing under Article 6(1) GDPR do not apply. The ruling confirms that the e-privacy rules, read alongside Article 95 GDPR, form the regulatory framework for email marketing, ensuring consumer protection and respect for users’ rights.

National Authorities Must Assess Civil Engineering Access Obligations Against All Objectives of the EU Electronic Communications Code

On 20 November 2025, the CJEU clarified that when a national regulatory authority considers imposing an obligation of access to civil engineering assets on an undertaking with significant market power under Article 72 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972, it must ensure compliance with all objectives listed in Article 3 of the directive. The case (C-327/24), referred by the Administrative Court of Cologne (Germany), involved a dispute between Telekom Deutschland GmbH and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Court emphasised that the objectives, promoting connectivity and high-capacity networks, fostering competition, contributing to the internal market, and protecting consumers, must all be taken into account on an equal footing, with none enjoying priority. This ruling ensures that national authorities adopt access obligations in a way fully aligned with the broader goals of the European Electronic Communications Code, rather than focusing solely on competition or end-user considerations.

Será consumidora uma pessoa que adquire um imóvel para arrendamento?

Jurisprudência

No passado dia 24 de outubro, o Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia (TJUE) proferiu uma decisão no âmbito do Processo C-347/23 (Caso Zabitoń). O caso centra-se na interpretação do conceito de consumidor numa situação em que duas pessoas casadas (LB, agente da polícia, e JL, diretora de uma escola) adquirem um bem imóvel, celebrando um contrato de crédito hipotecário para o efeito, com a intenção de obter rendimentos do imóvel por via do seu arrendamento posterior.

O TJUE examina se os membros deste casal podem ser enquadrados na categoria de consumidor, à luz do direito europeu, beneficiando da legislação mais protetora que é conferida a este, nomeadamente pela diretiva das cláusulas abusivas.

Destaca-se que o conceito de consumidor, de acordo com o direito europeu, se aplica, em regra, a pessoas singulares que adquirem bens ou serviços para fins pessoais, ou seja, alheios a uma atividade profissional. Assim, a motivação dos compradores é analisada com vista a determinar se o ato de aquisição de um imóvel com a finalidade de o arrendar lhe retira o caráter de consumo pessoal, transformando-o numa atividade profissional.

O TJUE decide que, apesar do objetivo de obter proveito com o arrendamento, os membros do casal devem ser considerados consumidores. O tribunal argumenta que a aquisição do imóvel não ocorre no âmbito de uma atividade profissional contínua e organizada. Assim, o simples facto de obter uma vantagem económica não transforma os compradores em profissionais. Não existindo uma intenção de exercer uma atividade imobiliária contínua, o negócio é enquadrado como um ato de consumo.

O TJUE realça a importância de uma interpretação do conceito de consumidor que garanta a segurança jurídica e a proteção no mercado. O tribunal opta, assim, por proteger o casal, considerando que a aquisição se traduz numa típica relação de consumo, não tendo os compradores experiência profissional no setor imobiliário nem atuando com caráter de habitualidade. Visa-se apenas, citando o acórdão, “consolidar o seu património privado”, sendo “uma forma de investimento” (ponto 33).

Esta decisão é bastante revelante, uma vez que a solução adotada não era evidente. Com efeito, o imóvel fora, neste caso, adquirido como um investimento, com vista à obtenção de rendimentos, o que poderia aproximar o negócio de uma atividade profissional, que se caracteriza precisamente pela finalidade lucrativa. Concorda-se, no entanto, com a decisão, na medida em que se tratou de um ato isolado, único[1], não revelando o exercício de uma atividade profissional, com regularidade. O arrendamento tem, na verdade, caráter regular, mas está aqui em causa o contrato de compra e venda do imóvel. O casal pretendia apenas fazer um investimento ao comprar o imóvel, colocando o seu património a render, sem ter conhecimentos específicos na área em causa. Julgo que a decisão poderia já ser outra se o casal comprasse um segundo imóvel para arrendar ou tivesse já outros imóveis arrendados. Aí se deverá, na minha perspetiva, traçar a fronteira entre ser ou não consumidor (ou não ser ou ser profissional, respetivamente).

É interessante notar que, no contrato de arrendamento, também não se poderá, reflexamente, considerar o casal (senhorio) como profissional, não se aplicando, portanto, a legislação de consumo. A qualificação como consumidor no contrato de compra do imóvel (e no contrato de crédito hipotecário associado) tem, portanto, o importante efeito de não se proteger como consumidor uma outra pessoa (inquilino) numa outra relação ligada a esta.

Podemos concluir deste caso, em suma, que o investimento ainda pode ser considerado consumo se não tiver caráter regular.

[1] No ponto 11 da decisão, refere-se que “os demandantes no processo principal não deram de arrendamento outros bens imóveis”.